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This Article explains the legal and technological structure of the
modern Internet and how courts have been building a First
Amendment law for the information age without realizing that literal
adherence to the tenets of the offline First Amendment will threaten
core First Amendment values on the Internet. It then endeavors to
explain how we might look to the First Amendment's roots in
building a concept of the Freedom of Speech that accounts for the
uniqueness of the New Speech, and the needs of the emerging
Information Society.
Every major technological change since before the invention of
the telegraph has seen a concomitant warning that this new
technology threatens important First Amendment values. Louis
Brandeis' seminal Article on the "right to privacy" was a response, at
least in part, to disruptive technological change and, in particular the
introduction of the compact photographic camera.' Since that time,
the telegraph, radio, telephone, and television have all engendered
similar challenges,2 but in each case we have managed as a society-
* Visiting Fellow at the Yale Law School Information Society Project; Associate at
Gibson Dunn, Washington, D.C. This article profited incalculably from the comments of
Priscilla Smith. I also owe special thanks to Jack Balkin, Josh Blackman, Kiel Brennan-
Marquez, Bryan Choi, Anjali Dalal, Margot Kaminski, Nicholas McLean, David Pozen,
and all the participants at the 2013 Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference
Workshop who helped to refine it. The editors at the Hastings Constitutional Law
Quarterly who worked extraordinarily hard to see this article improved also deserve
special recognition-especially Kyla Gibboney, whose steady hand guided it at every step.
Finally, Charles Reich and Lance Liebman made this article possible.
1. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890) ("Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have
invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be
proclaimed from the house-tops."'); see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
1431-32 & nn.189-92 (2001) (describing Brandeis' article and its motivations).
2. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1644 (1967); Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism,
[235]
with some important exceptions'-to more or less preserve the First
Amendment's basic doctrines,' and have held up those doctrines as a
vaunted shield against government regulation of speech in the private
sphere.! Those who have warned against possible threats to the First
Amendment arising from technological change have been proven
"wrong" countless times. Because of this, claims that a new
technology will require a fundamental shift in how our society
protects the "freedom of speech" are dismissed as naive or tired
before they are even fully aired. Such are the wages of crying wolf.
Nonetheless, this Article argues that this time really is different
because the Internet-with its unique combination of enormous data
storage, processing power, and algorithmic sophistication-is unlike
any technological change we have seen before. While the disruptive
technologies of the past helped to make information available more
widely, more quickly, or more permanently, thereby upsetting the
free speech balances of their time, digital technology also stands to
grant unprecedented individuated control to the intermediary who
carries that information. This makes these intermediaries-which
take the form of search engines, social networks, and other media
platforms-extraordinarily powerful. But, these intermediaries are
more than just powerful in the traditional sense of "powerful
speakers." Rather, they stand boldly and often invisibly between
individuals who wish to speak to each other, fundamentally altering
Electoral Pathologies, and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1373, 1377 (2007); see also Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of
Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933, 934-36 (2008) (placing Professor Barron's article in
context and describing the notion that the First Amendment might confer "positive"
rights).
3. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 204 (1997) (upholding
"must carry" rules requiring cable operators to carry signals of local broadcast stations);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (allowing for more extensive regulation of the
content of radio and television broadcasts than other forms of media because of their
instantaneity); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the so-called
"fairness doctrine" requiring broadcasters to present both sides of controversial public
issues).
4. Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an
Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 702 (2010) ("[A]lthough
Supreme Court precedent and our free speech traditions are agnostic as to which private
actor should serve as the intermediary, they are very clear that it should not be the
government, and when choosing between censorship by a private actor and the
government, the choice should always favor the former over the latter.").
5. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 782-83 (1987) ("This
peculiar status of free speech in our constitutional scheme, as the one plea for limited
government that appears to be embraced by all, has not gone unnoticed by free market
theorists. ").
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the residual freedom of every individual who uses them. Without the
ability to bring law to bear on how-and how much-these
intermediaries intercede to interfere with speech between individuals,
the individual freedoms to speak and be heard possessed by each one
of us are threatened in a way they have never been before. These
intermediaries stand to control-often unnoticeably but nevertheless
profoundly-what information individuals receive, how they receive
it, and with whom they can share it. As this Article explains, this is
something they already do to a remarkable extent and with
surprisingly little attention to the way these decisions impact
individual autonomy and deliberative democracy.6
The New Speech
The Internet today is like the frontier once was. The government
has stayed its hand, backed away, and allowed institutions,
organizations, corporations, and communities to grow and flourish
there without law. Absent the threat of government intrusion, this
new frontier has found itself free to innovate and prosper. In
preventing itself from regulating what happened on the Internet, the
government invited individuals and entities to stake out claims to this
vast and verdant wilderness, and build a new world upon it.'
This was a great and necessary choice. It has long been the
preferred method of fostering colonization in strange new landscapes,
and spurring the machinery of innovation in times where uncertainty
and fear might stymy growth. We saw it in the colonization of
America, and of the West. We saw it in the construction of the
machinery of industrial society, and of the technology of
telecommunications. Where the need for experimentation,
innovation and immigration outweighed the interests of equality and
fraternity, government has withdrawn its hand and allowed its citizens
to rely for their protection on each other-on order, without law.
6. See discussion infra Part III.
7. See ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB BINDS
THE WORLD TOGETHER IN COMMERCE 57 (2013). Recently, Professor Chander has
written extensively in praise of this political-institutional decision, and its impact on the
growth of technology in Silicon Valley and the United States more broadly. See, e.g.,
Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, The Free Speech Foundations of Cyberlaw, UC Davis
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 351 (Aug. 23, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2320124.
And his thesis is quite compelling, and probably right. The contention of this Article,
however, is that the legal regime that nurtured the emerging Internet is unsuited to the
Internet as a mature medium.
Winter 2014] THE NEW SPEECH 237
So we come to today, 2014, and we see a slice of history, a sliver
of time, the Internet of the modern state. Through this slender
shutter we observe that in the Internet's dominion, every means and
method of legal organization is aligned to prevent the government
from interference. Terms of Service agreements provide the first line
of defense from government incursion, thwarting lawsuits over
manipulation and deception, wrongful censorship, and unjust
dissolution and exclusion. Federal laws provide the second line of
defense. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act' and the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act9 deliver civil and criminal penalties for attempts
to subvert and circumvent the technological fortifications media
platforms erect; a lesser known federal law-47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)-
immunizes platforms from responsibility for speech-related torts of
any kind, even when those torts would give rise to colorable claims
beyond the First Amendment's ordinary scope.o The third line of
defense is structural: There is no baseline constitutional right to
protection from private censorship, manipulation, deception, or
exclusion on the Internet because major speech platforms are neither
state actors nor "places of public accommodation," and therefore
carry no obligation to guarantee, protect, or respect the expressive
interests of the tens of millions of individuals who pass through their
domains each day.n
Notwithstanding these obstructions, built seemingly into the very
lattice of creation, these defenses and entitlements are not what
should concern us. They are epiphenomenal, ephemeral, nebulous,
and changeable. With the passage of time, when the needs of a rising
state can do without them, they can and will be changed-modified to
bring the virtual world into alignment with the real one. These laws,
institutions, and frameworks are merely legislative and regulatory.
They were designed to foster exploration and discovery in a brave
8. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)).
9. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
10. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2006). The little-known story of the statute is that it
was enacted in part to encourage cooperative censorship by private platforms. See
Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 262
(2006) ("Without requiring filtering by gatekeepers, the CDA expressed a desire to
encourage it. To do so, it loosened the emerging state-level gatekeeper liability regime for
defamation and other common law torts ... apparently to encourage 'Good Samaritan'
blocking and screening of offensive material.").
11. See infra note 111. As far as our law is concerned the lowliest restauranteur owes
anyone who steps into her dining room greater obligations-in a legal sense-than even
the most dominant platform.
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new world as it developed. As that world civilizes, change will follow.
Law will emerge.
Or at least, law would emerge, if it could. This Article is
concerned primarily with the fourth and final line of defense from
government incursion, the Red Line that will decide the fate of much
of human interaction for next the two generations: the First
Amendment. The First Amendment, long the three-headed guardian
at the door between individual liberty and government tyranny, could
become the primary enemy of free expression in the digital age.
Why should the First Amendment concern us this much? And
why now? Why in this way? Consider the world a decade from now,
when individuals and governments have come to realize that major
search engines and social networks are some of society's most vital
cultural and political institutions. It is a world in which citizens have
begun to see that online communities have replaced parks, sidewalks,
streets, and street corners as the primary forums for debate and
deliberation. It is a world where they see that book clubs, knitting
groups, softball leagues, and debate societies take place not in private
parlors, public parks, school, and universities, but on platform-hosted
forums mediated by algorithms and commercial interests. It is a
world in which people have begun to wonder at the ways in which
algorithms hide the information they seek, obscure and slant the
opinions that they read, broadcast what they say to unintended
listeners, or modify and manipulate their words so that those they
mean to reach never hear the message as they intend it to be heard.
To envision this world is to realize that there has always been
another phase on the horizon; that a time of regulation is coming and
that the Internet cannot remain free of law forever. But, a storm
gathers, and it is a familiar one. It is a pathology, a recurrent mistake,
woven into the fabric of our legal culture. It is the judicial protection
of old values in the face of new realities, and it will stymy this move to
regulate the Internet.
Precisely one hundred years ago, we saw this resistance to
regulation emerge through the preservation of liberty of contract in
the face of a major social reorganization. This was the era of Lochner
and contract liberty-the judicial preservation of the "freedom of
contract" in the face of legislative attempts to grapple with the
complex industrial society that was emerging.12 Exactly fifty years
12. See John G. Palfrey, The Constitution and the Courts, 26 HARV. L. REv. 507, 517-
18 (1913); Roscoe Pound, The End of Law As Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27
HARV. L. REv. 195, 198 (1914); Note, Extent of the Legislative Power to Limit Freedom of
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later, the courts again confronted the conflict between old forms and
new realities in acknowledging the development of a New Property as
part and parcel of an emerging Welfare State.13
We are on the brink of a new Information Society, and with it a
New Speech. There is a New Speech in two senses of the word. On
one hand, we are seeing a new speech emerge technologically. The
Internet is a massive vortex drawing in data, information and
knowledge and pours forth articles, posts, lists, links, offers, ads,
forums, games, videos, music, chatrooms, reviews, previews, remixes,
snippets, shares, upvotes, downvotes, and entire virtual worlds. The
making and distributing of these things has long been what it means
to speak. But, while in a pre-Internet age these objects and their
analogues were created and disseminated primarily by human beings,
today they are intermediated, distributed, altered, edited, and
increasingly primarily created by machine. How these technological
changes impact old notions of what it means to "speak" poses a
vexing challenge.
On the other hand, the judicial response to this technological
change means that we are also witnessing the first steps in the
creation of a new kind of speech legally and constitutionally. And
while it takes many forms, it all shares one characteristic: Its jagged
contours increasingly conflict with other important constitutional
commitments. First Amendment-protected speech is increasingly the
transmission or possession of data or information, in any form and for
whatever purpose. It matters less and less whether that information
and data are tied to any particular speaker or directed at any
particular audience.14 Nor do the motives of the regulator seem to
Contract, 27 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1914); Note, Legislative Minimum Wage for Women and
Minors, 28 HARV. L. REV. 89 (1914).
13. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964). Compare
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960) with Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8
(1970). The "New Property" Reich described is the "property" individuals acquire
through the grant of a privilege or a payment from the government-for example, "a relief
check or a television license." Reich, supra, at 746. Reich worried that if courts failed to
recognize these things as "property"-treating them instead as government privileges-it
would grant the government enormous power to direct the lives of any individual who
depended for their livelihood on government largesse. Reich worried that this would lead
to a shift in the balance of power between individuals and the State, making them
dependent on the government's good graces, depriving them of the individual liberty to
direct the paths of their own lives without fear that the government might choose to
withdraw its gifts without warning or reason.
14. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011); United States v.
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585-86 (2010) (holding that depictions of animal cruelty are
speech even if they lack any "expressive value"); Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th
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matter to its protection." The preservation of editorial control, and
the concomitant preservation of choice about what information will
be presented and what will be hidden, has torn its way to the apex of
First Amendment protection," even as formalism about what it means
for something to count as speech ascends in the courts."
This judicial reaction is a natural one given our historical
intermingling of the institution of speech as a bulwark against
government overreach and as an affirmative and individual right to
self-determination. Traditionally, freedom of speech has simply built
a wall between the individual and the state to effectuate both values.
It erected this wall to protect conscience and autonomy, association
and dissension, participation and deliberation as much as it did to
prevent government oppression. But, ironically, in the new
Information Society, preventing government from enacting speech-
focused regulation means that powerful private interests will hold
enormous power to shape how individuals interact with each other
and perceive the world. In a society that holds the values of
individual conscience and autonomy in high esteem, the power to
control and shape the very reality we see and the world that we
experience strikes at the very heart of self-determination.
This Article takes what is, at the moment, an unpopular
position." Even the majority of legal scholars-ordinarily friendlier
Cir. 2000); U.S. W., Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999); Langdon v. Google,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc.,
No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003).
15. See, e.g., Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 270-72 (4th Cir. 2010). But see
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996); Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You
Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 539, 574 (2012); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1095, 1146-47 (2005).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543-47 (2012) (holding that
government cannot place significant restrictions on misrepresentations and deception
outside narrowly defined categories); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin.,
696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that tobacco labeling requirements are
compelled speech).
17. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011); Am.
Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001); Search King, Inc.,
2003 WL 21464568 (calling Google search results "opinions").
18. This Article enters a vast and evolving literature, but many of the problems it
identifies still seem far away, and many scholars and advocates worry that an increased
governmental role on the internet may itself pose significant risks to core First
Amendment values. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 702 (exploring these questions but
concluding that "although Supreme Court precedent and our free speech traditions are
agnostic as to which private actor should serve as the intermediary, they are very clear that
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to government regulation than most-favor sweeping judicial
protections for powerful media platforms when the alternative is to
empower the government to intercede. 9  And, certainly, the
government is often the most important threat to the freedom of
speech. But, this Article is an attempt to explain why the government
should have the power to ensure that values of autonomy and
individual freedom are preserved on the Internet. It is an attempt to
show how placing unfettered discretion into the hands of powerful
digital intermediaries threatens to erode access to knowledge, distort
our common cultural conversation, cement inequality of wealth and
privilege, and suppress the very voices on society's margins that the
First Amendment was written to protect.
The remainder of this piece proceeds in five Parts. First, it
examines the nature of digital creation, intermediation, and
dissemination. Second, it reviews the system of law that is emerging.
Third, it examines some of the consequences to the individual, to
private interests, and to society. Fourth, it considers the functions of
speech and its relationship to other vital constitutional commitments.
Finally, it turns to the future of the First Amendment in the new
society that is coming. The objective is to present an overview-a
way of looking at many seemingly unrelated problems. Inevitably,
such an effort must be incomplete and tentative, but it is long past
time that we took account of the new world taking form around us.
It is difficult to imagine, at this juncture, what the world will look
like when individuals and governments begin to attempt to roll back
the muscular protections we have put in place to protect major media
it should not be the government"). Where I have been able, I have credited those whose
work predates my own. However, in many ways this Article articulates a new perspective
on the interaction between law and technology. Where possible, I attempt to show where
my views diverge from the prevailing orthodoxy. For a sampling of scholars who argue
that the judiciary's understanding of the First Amendment will have only a small part to
play in the drama that is the evolving idea of "speech" in a digital age, see LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE 79 (2006); TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF
INFORMATION EMPIRES 304 (2010); Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in A
Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 427 (2009). See also Marvin Ammori, First Amendment
Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1 (2012) ("[C]onstitutional scholarship generally
overlooks the role that judicial doctrine plays in ensuring the availability of spaces for
speech."); Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757,
1761 (1995) ("Many people think that there is now nothing distinctive about the electronic
media or about modem communications technologies that justifies an additional
governmental role.").
19. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014);
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445 (2013); Tim Wu,
Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013).
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platforms from regulation. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, what
the Internet will look like when we repeal the immunities awarded in
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) and decline to enforce Terms of Service
contracts that immunize platforms from liability for censorship and
exclusion. But, it was also difficult in 1914 to envision a world in
which judges allowed legislatures to freely regulate the terms of
employment contracts, and to envision a world in which Congress
could freely regulate child labor and minimum wages. The result was
a lost generation: more than thirty years of delay in the creation of a
legal order reflective of the needs of an underlying industrial society.
It would be wise to regard the lessons of history now as we bear
witness to the new society that is emerging, lest we wait until 2037 to
see the judiciary finally relent, and allow the regulation of the digital
world in a manner reflective of the needs of an underlying
information society."
I. Digital Intermediation and the Control of Information
A. The Forms of Information Power
Ours is an information age, marked by the rapid evolution of
power from control over property and promises21 to control over
knowledge and information.22 The ways in which digital expression
interacts with other constitutional values are of wide variety. Some of
these interactions merely enhance aspects of speech that have always
been troubling; others are entirely new. Some interfere with
individuals' First Amendment rights to speak, to engage, to create,
and to dissent, while others interfere with other important individual
rights, such as rights to self-determination, equal participation, and
government protection.
20. Cf Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning
of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459,459 (2001) ("Finally, in 1937, a
single justice changed his vote and a new majority of the Supreme Court initiated the
modem tradition of judicial deference to economic and social welfare legislation.").
21. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 236 (1922).
22. Balkin, supra, note 18, at 427; cf. Somin Sengupta, Letting Down Our Guard With
Web Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/
web-privacy-and-how-consumers-let-down-their-guard.html?pagewanted=all& r=0 ("If
iron ore was the raw material that enriched the steel baron Andrew Carnegie in the
Industrial Age, personal data is what fuels the barons of the Internet age.").
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1. How Algorithms Grant Platforms a Unique Capacity for Detailed
Content Discrimination
Software offers an enormous capacity to tailor the experience of
each individual who interacts with a program or a platform. The
ability to customize user experience arises from the marriage of
cheap, fast processing power, and immense aggregations of data.
Automation grants merchants unprecedented powers to use
information they already possess or can easily buy to tailor what they
say, how they say it, and to whom they say it. Advertisers using
software that tracks user identities across the Internet can select
advertisements for individual users that appeal to their tastes,
preferences, heuristics, and biases.23 Knowing users' relative wealth
23. While some websites, such as Amazon.com use their own data to generate
custom, targeted advertising, cross-cutting Internet marketing companies employing
sophisticated datasets are increasingly allowing for across-the-network behavioral
advertising. See Emily Steel & Jilia Angwin, On the Web's Cutting Edge, Anonymity in
Name Only, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870
3294904575385532109190198.html; Somini Sengupta, What You Didn't Post, Facebook
May Still Know, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/
technology/facebook-expands-targeted-advertising-through-outside-data-sources.html. As
the CEO of the Internet's "largest data exchange" explained in faraway 2009:
On the "sell side" we empower leading publishers who deliver
targeting data on nearly 120 million unique users in vertical segments
including Auto, Travel, Finance, Shopping and Demographics....
We are capturing billions of deep granular data points-what we call
qualified targeting events--on multiple activity levels. We analyze the
targeting events in our data lab and roll them into specific Targeting
Segments based on three high level categorizations. These
categorizations include Demographic data derived from user site
registration information on top social nets (NOT inferred
information), consumer Interest data gathered from specific site
activity on relevant vertical sites (such as parenting and auto enthusiast
sites), and deep purchase Intent data culled from relevant commerce
activity on top transactional sites. We further segment and sub-
segment this data into relevant buckets that in many cases drill down
to the product and keyword level.
Rev Share and Rental Pricing Models Bring Accountability to eXelate Data Exchange Says
CEO Zohar, ADEXCHANGER (May 28, 2009), http://www.adexchanger.com/data-
exchanges/data-exchange-exelate-zohar. For scholarly discussion of the emerging issues
pervasive behaviorally informed targeted advertising presents, see Mark MacCarthy, New
Directions in Privacy: Disclosure, Unfairness and Externalities, 6 I.S.J.L. & POL'Y 425, 496-
510 (2011); Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided
Chicken to Informational Norms, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 49, 57-59 (2012).
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and willingness to pay, merchants can charge some individuals more
24and some less for the same product or service.
Speech by individuals now passes through at least one
intermediary with immense and increasing power to alter its contents,
25
message, and presentation. Social media websites can monitor chats
and messages between users for illegal or immoral activities.26 Search
providers may return a different list of search results to each
individual Internet user." When items are shared and "favorited" on
24. Though their efforts have been halting, it seems that firms routinely engage in
surreptitious first and second-order price discrimination where they can. See Jakub
Mikians et al., Detecting Price and Search Discrimination on the Internet, at 79, 80 (2012),
available at http://conferences.sigcomm.org/hotnets/2012/papers/hotnetsl2-final94.pdf;
Virginia Heffernan, Amazon's Prime Suspect, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/08/08/magazine/08FOB-medium-t.html?_r=0; Anita Ramasastry, Web
Sites Change Prices Based on Customers' Habits, CNN (June 24, 2005), http://www.cnn.
com/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/; Joseph Turow, Have They Got a Deal
for You: It's Suspiciously Cozy in the Cybermarket, WASH. POST (June 19, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/18/AR2005061800070.
html. For academic discussion of this phenomenon, see Matthew A. Edwards, Price and
Prejudice: The Case Against Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 559, 571-74 (2006); Mark R. Patterson, Non-Network Barriers to Network
Neutrality, 78 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2843, 2856-57 (2010); and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV.
1667, 1732-34 (2008).
25. See generally Yoo, supra note 4.
26. Facebook and other social platforms monitor user communications for criminal
activity and notify police if any suspicious behavior is detected. See Joseph Menn, Social
Networks Scan for Sexual Predators with Uneven Results, REUTERS (July 12, 2012), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/12/us-usa-internet-predators-idUSBRE86B5G20120712.
Facebook has also monitored user-to-user messages, blocking links to filesharing websites.
See Ryan Singel, Facebook's E-mail Censorship is Legally Dubious, Experts Say, WIRED
(May 6, 2009), http://www.wired.com/business/2009/ 05/facebooks-e-mail-censorship-is-
legally-dubious-experts-say ("Facebook declined to answer questions about whether it
similarly searched private messages for references to illegal drugs, underage drinking or
shoplifting."). Like all censorship, the targeting was overbroad, as all links to filesharing
websites were blocked, including links to files it was legal to share. See id. Messages were
still being monitored as recently as November of 2010. See Ryan Singel, New Facebook
Messaging Continues to Block Some Links, WIRED (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.wired.com/
business/2010/11/facebook-link-blocking ("So will Facebook being using the content of
messages to better profile its users? The company says no.").
27. Google engages, when it can, in what it calls "search personalization." Its search
results change on a variety of criteria, including the geographic location of the search, and
one's past "search history." See Carl Franzen, Impersonal Google Search Results Are Few
and Far Between DuckDuckGo Finds, TPM (Oct. 15, 2012), http://talkingpointsmemo.com
/idealab/impersonal-google-search-results-are-few-and-far-between-duckduckgo-finds
("[I]n the case of searches for 'abortion,' some users received information on Obama's
public stance on abortion, while others did not. Some users also received information on
pro-life activist Gianna Jessen while others did not."). Both Google and Bing are
competing to return more personalized results with data mined from their own and other
Winter 2014]1 THE NEW SPEECH 245
social websites, social media companies have enormous discretion to
decide who sees what is shared." In communities that aggregate
content on the basis of popularity, the election can be rigged, puffed,
and manipulated.29 Posts on message boards and forums can
disappear in the blink of an eye or simply never post in the first
place. Newspaper articles with egregious mistakes or untruths can
social networks. See Larry Magid, How (and why) To Turn Off Google's Personalized
Search Results, FORBES (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2012/01/13
/how-and-why-to-turn-off-googles-personalized-search-results; Nick Wingfield, A
Revamping of Bing in the Battle for Search Engine Supremacy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/technology/bing-search-engine-to-be-revamped
-as-war-against-google-intensifies.html. Orbitz and other travel websites may use search
discrimination as a method of price-discrimination. See Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac
Users Steered to Pricier Hotels, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702304458604577488822667325882.html.
28. Facebook's frequently changing privacy policy means that new, previously
private, personal data is constantly being exposed with Facebook's default mode being to
"share" it. See Somini Sengupta, Staying Private on the New Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
6, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/technology/personaltech/protecting-your-
privacy-on-the-new-facebook.html. As Facebook rolls out "social search," Facebook's
default setting is to allow "strangers, along with 'friends' on Facebook, to discover who
you are, what you like and where you go." Id. A forthcoming paper finds that each
Facebook post is seen by 24% of a user's friends on average, and that users underestimate
their audience size by a factor of four. See Michael S. Bernstein et al., Quantifying the
Invisible Audience in Social Networks, at 4 (ACM SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors
in Computing System Conference Paper) (Apr. 27-May 2, 2013), available at http://static2.
volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2013/Facebook_1462.pdf. Facebook's troubles keeping user
information private are well known. See, e.g., Nick Bilton, Facebook Changes Privacy
Settings, Again, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2012), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/
facebook-changes-privacy-settings-again; Somini Sengupta, Private Posts on Facebook
Revealed, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/ private-
posts-on-facebook-revealed.
29. Marketers target websites such as Reddit (a website that allows for social
upvoting and downvoting) to make it seem as if their brands are "organically" popular.
See Ryan Holiday, Hail Corporate: The Increasingly Insufferable Faker of Brands on
Reddit, BETABEAT (Feb. 21, 2013), http://betabeat.com/2013/02/hail-corporate-the-
increasingly-insufferable-fakery-of-brands-on-reddit/. Reddit censors such efforts. See
Kevin Morris, Reddit Bans The Atlantic and Businessweek in Major Anti-Spam Move,
THE DAILY DOT (June 13, 2012), http://www.dailydot.comlnews/reddit-ban-the-atlantic-
phsyorg-businessweek; see also EVGENY MOROZOV, To SAVE EVERYTHING CLICK
HERE: THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM 155-57 (2013) (describing the
practice and its consequences).
30. See Colleen Taylor, Is This Censorship? Facebook Stops Users From Posting
'Irrelevant Or Inappropriate' Comments, TECHCRUNCH (May 5, 2012), http://techcrunch.
com/2012/05/05/facebooks-positive-comment-policy-irrelevant-inappropriate-censorship.
As a policy spokesperson explained when a legitimate comment was preemptively blocked
by Facebook:
To protect the millions of people who connect and share on Facebook
every day, we have automated systems that work in the background to
maintain a trusted environment and protect our users from bad actors
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be altered surreptitiously without requiring public notice and public
correction.1  Different versions of the same article may be accessible
only to some, and at different times, in different places.32
2. How the Structure of Digital Technologies Grants Powerful Platforms
Unique Control over Access
Speech, commerce, and social activities on the Internet pass
through hubs-the major nodes in the network. These hubs are
inevitable: the result of ineradicable physical constraints and rational
collective action. It takes vast amounts of computer processing power
and data storage capacity merely to index the network and make it
searchable." The same is true of other large information
who often use links to spread spam and malware. These systems are so
effective that most people who use Facebook will never encounter
spam. They're not perfect, though, and in rare instances they make
mistakes. This comment was mistakenly blocked as spammy, and we
have already started to make adjustments to our classifier. We look
forward to learning from rare cases such as these to make sure we
don't repeat the same mistake in the future.
Josh Constine, Facebook Says Today's Comment Limitations Are Due to Spam Filter, Not
Censorship, TECHCRUNCH (May 5, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/05/05/facebook-
comment-limitations-are-a-spam-filter-not-censorship.
31. Most major news organizations do not have formal corrections policies, and the
evidence seems to suggest that whatever corrections do occur, they happen secretly to the
text itself without a correction notice and without preserving the error in the text. See
Clint Hendler, If a Correction Falls in the Woods..., COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July 23,
2010), http://www.cjr.org/behindjthe-news/if-a correction-fallsin-the-w.php?page=all;
Craig Silverman, The State of Online Corrections, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 12,
2010), http://www.cjr.org/behind the-news/the-state-of-online-correction.php?page=all.
32. Online news websites generate custom homepages and aggregate stories
according to information they have about their visitors. See Vadim Lavrusik, How News
Consumption is Shifting to the Personalized Social News Stream, MASHABLE (Aug. 10,
2010), http://mashable.com/2010/08/10/personalized-news-stream; see also MOROZOV,
supra, note 29, at 161-62 (describing Time Magazine's desire to begin engaging in such
news personalization). Debates about the possible costs and benefits of this new news
order are already emerging. Compare Jonathan Stray, Who Should See What When?
Three Principles for Personalized News, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.niemanlab.org/2012/07/who-should-see-what-when-three-principles-for-
personalized-news; Eli Pariser, When the Internet Thinks It Knows You, N.Y. TIMES (May
22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/opinion/23pariser.html? r=0; Jeremy Mims,
Personalization Isn't the Future of News (I Hope), OwNLOCAL (June 7, 2011),
http://ownlocal.com/newspaper-support-group/personalization-isnt-the-future-of-news. A
recent study from PEW reveals that 75% of news consumed online is through shared news
from social networking sites or e-mail. See Kristen Purcell et al., Understanding the
Participatory News Consumer (2010), available at http://www.
pewlntemet.org/Reports/2010/Online-News.aspx?r=1.
33. There is a tendency to believe that major Internet platforms are run out of dorm
rooms. This confuses the notion of concept and scale. The first McDonald's was a
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aggregators.' Search engines and other sophisticated data platforms
for linking and managing online interactions require capital
investment and, therefore, take corporate form." But, even if costs
were not significant, there would still be points of concentration.
Speakers and audiences seek mutual gathering places at which to hear
and be heard. It is unavoidable that some platforms will become
"focal points"-common cultural referents.36
These hubs, however, are different than the public fora of old. In
the digital realm, even the lowliest software author retains almost
perfect control over the data and use of data in the program she
provides. What this means is that those who provide the tools to
revolutionary concept and dominant in its small geographic domain, but it could not
become a national force without scale. The Internet plays by the same rules. See Steven
Levy, Google Throws Open Doors to Its Top-Secret Data Center, WIRED (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://www.wired.com/wiredenterprise/2012/10/ff-inside-google-data-center/all ("This is
what makes Google Google: its physical network, its thousands of fiber miles, and those
many thousands of servers that, in aggregate, add up to the mother of all clouds. This
multibillion-dollar infrastructure allows the company to index 20 billion web pages a day.
To handle more than 3 billion daily search queries. To conduct millions of ad auctions in
real time. To offer free email storage to 425 million Gmail users. To zip millions of
YouTube videos to users every day. To deliver search results before the user has finished
typing the query. In the near future, when Google releases the wearable computing
platform called Glass, this infrastructure will power its visual search results."); see also
James Glanz, Google Details, and Defends, Its Use of Electricity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/09/technology/google-details-and-defends-its-use-
of-electricity.html ("[Google's] data centers around the world continuously draw almost
260 million watts-about a quarter of the output of a nuclear power plant."); Quentin
Hardy, VMware Lets a Thousand Clouds Contend, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/vmware-let-a-thousand-clouds-contend ("Google
has 1.5 million servers ... conducting Web searches and placing ads on the results. . .
Data centers consume up to 1.5% of the energy in the world. Levy, supra.
34. See, e.g., Quentin Hardy, Active in Cloud, Amazon Reshapes Computing, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/technology/active-in-cloud-
amazon-reshapes-computing.html ("[J]ust one of the 10 data centers in Amazon's Eastern
United States region has ... more than 80,000 servers."); see also Quentin Hardy, BITS;
Cisco's Plan For Next 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9AO4EFDA1038F93BA25750COA9659D8B63 ("Cisco has already
deployed about $180 billion worth of network equipment into the world .... ").
35. See John Markoff & Saul Hansell, Hiding in Plain Sight, Google Seeks More
Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/14/technology/
14search.html?pagewanted=all ("Google, Microsoft and Yahoo! are spending vast sums of
capital to build out their computing capabilities to run both search engines and a variety of
Web services that encompass e-mail, video and music downloads and online commerce.").
36. See THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-57 (1967)
(describing focal points as "each person's expectation of what the other expects him to
expect to be expected to do."). Schelling illustrated the concept with the following
problem: Tomorrow you have to meet a stranger in New York City. Where and when do
you meet them? The answer is remarkably consistent. See id. at 55 n.1. (The answer is in
Footnote 56).
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speak and listen now possess a degree of control over access to
commerce, speech, and social interaction never before known.
Platform control means content control. A media company can
unilaterally alter, remove, or advertise on top of an artist's creation."
A social media company can decide that a politically unpopular group
is bad for business, and quietly or overtly exclude them from the
conversation.39 Digital publishers can deprive users of access to
content en masse or individually-instantaneously and totally.40
37. See Julie Adler, The Public's Burden in A Digital Age: Pressures on
Intermediaries and the Privatization of Internet Censorship, 20 J.L. & POL'Y 231, 236-37
(2011).
38. YouTube, the Internet's most popular video-sharing website, employs a system
called "Content ID" that automatically flags videos as belonging to copyright holders and
then gives the content-owner three choices for how to deal with the content: they can
monetize it, track it, or block it. See Bryan E. Arsham, Note, Monetizing Infringement: A
New Legal Regime for Hosts of User-Generated Content, 101 GEO. L.J. 775, 791 (2013).
The system also sweeps content the copyright holder does not own-content that
constitutes "fair use" of copyrighted material-within its ambit as well. See Jonathan
McIntosh, Buffy vs Edward Remix Unfairly Removed by Lionsgate, REBELLIOUS PIXEL
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.rebelliouspixels.com/2013/buffy-vs-edward-remix-unfairly-
removed-by-lionsgate ("This is what a broken copyright enforcement system looks like.").
39. Political censorship is quiet but seemingly rampant on social networks and search
engines, though it is often claimed to be inadvertent. From the Left come cries of art and
intimacy treated as pornography. See Miguel Helft, Art School Runs Afoul of Facebook's
Nudity Police, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/art-
school-runs-afoul-of-facebooks-nudity-police; Amy Lee, Facebook Apologizes for
Censoring Gay Kiss Photo, HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2011/04/19/facebook-gay-kiss n_850941.html; Jennifer Nix, Art or Pornography?
You Should Decide-Not Facebook, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jennifer-nix/facebook-censorship b_1616735.html.
("Facebook now claims the authority to determine what does and does not constitute
art."). From the Right come claims of explicit ideological censorship dressed up as
censorship for bullying or harassment. See Joe Newby, Is Facebook Actively Censoring
Conservative Bloggers?, EXAMINER (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.examiner.com/article/is-
facebook-actively-censoring-conservative-bloggers; Erik Wemple, Facebook Admits Error
in Censoring Anti-Obama Message, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/post/facebook-admits-error-in-censoring-anti-
obama-message/2012/10/31/d6063c22-235e-11e2-ac85-e669876c6a24_blog.html ("Facebook
took the image down. .. and froze the account for 24 hours, in effect stifling SOS on
Facebook."). See also EVGENY MOROzOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF
INTERNET FREEDOM 205-44 (2011) (describing similar events); MOROZOV, supra note 29,
at 140-80 (describing same events).
40. In July 2009, Amazon remotely deleted, without notice or compensation, two
George Orwell e-books from thousands of Kindle devices. The books were Animal Farm
and 1984. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES (July
17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html. As
one purchaser explained, "I never imagined that Amazon actually had the right, the
authority or even the ability to delete something that I had already purchased." Id. For
academic commentary on the notion of what one might call "remote" exclusion, see
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Platform control means control over who may enter, who must
leave, who may speak, who must defer, and who must remain silent.
One's access to a platform may be cut off totally and permanently
without notice or opportunity for recourse.41 One may be deprived of
vested status and membership,42 or be barred from participation on
Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon "Kindles" the Copy Ownership
Debate, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 147, 176 (2010); Joseph E. Van Tassel, Remote Deletion
Technology, License Agreements, and the Distribution of Copyrighted Works, 97 VA. L.
REV. 1223 (2011).
41. See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 831 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Summary of Pleading at 1, Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(No. 11 Civ. 918) (alleging that the account was disabled suddenly and without
explanation). As Mustafa Fteja explains in his handwritten response to the question on
the complaint form-"[briefly describe the reasons why you should be granted what you
are requesting]"-"Facebook has become a serious tool for communication. I rely on
Facebook to communicate with family and friends around the world. The nature of
Facebook disabled account doesn't let your contact know that your account was disabled.
Contacts assume that I cut ties with family and friends causing me severe personal harm,
and hurt my personal feelings by discriminating." Complaint Form at 2, Fteja v.
Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11 Civ. 918).
42. The banning of the prominent Wikipedia Editor "Essjay" was one of the most
significant and controversial events in the history of Wikipedia. Essjay held himself out as
a college "professor," told other editors that he held doctoral degrees in theology and
Canon law, and worked as a tenured professor at a private university. Through the use of
his persona, Essjay became a respected and trusted member of Wikipedia, eventually
rising to the highest level of authority in the community, ultimately being elected a
"bureaucrat"-a user of such regard that he held total discretionary control over
membership, access, and editing on Wikipedia. He also sat on ArbCom, Wikipedia's
Supreme Court. He could ban anyone, and edit anything, and even make other
Bureaucrats. He resolved disputes between editors and helped to resolve one of the most
important controversies the encyclopedia has ever faced (the Seigenthaler controversy).
In fact, Essjay was Ryan Jordan, a twenty-four-year-old community college dropout. In a
trial process that can only be described as tortious, and after hundreds of hours of
investigation and debate, Essjay left Wikipedia. See Noam Cohen, A Contributor to
Wikipedia Has His Fictional Side, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/05/technology /05wikipedia.html?pagewanted=all; Essjay
controversy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Essjayscontroversy (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013); Stacy Schiff, Know It All: Can Wikipedia Conquer Expertise?, THE NEW
YORKER (July 31, 2006), http://www.newyorker. comlarchive/2006/07/31/060731fafact.
Transcripts and the record in the matter of Essjay remain available on Wikipedia. See
User:Essjay/RFC, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/User:Essjay/RFC (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013). An exchange near the end of the more than fifty-thousand-word
administrative proceeding is particularly telling-"Now that Essjay has retired from
Wikipedia and has foregone his various flags, it's time to end the pile on. Let's get on with
building an encyclopedia [written by:] MER-C 03:30, 4 March 2007.... I don't think
there's a 'pile-on.' Essjay was one of the most trusted Wikipedians in the history of this
project, and his deception touches everyone who ever loved this place.... [written by:]-
CH 03:38, 4 March 2007 (UTC)." Id. Though there is no definitive academic account, a
good first cut at history can be found in Shun-Ling Chen, Wikipedia: A Republic of Science
Democratized, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 247, 285-88 (2010). The Essjay Controversy led
many to lobby for more code-based restrictions on editing Wikipedia. Id. at 287. For
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the basis of criteria over which one has no control and cannot
change.43 One may be excluded from participation on the basis of the
viewpoint or content of his message, the manner of his presentation,
or, indeed, for nearly any reason at all. The right to exclude from
access may be the most strongly guarded legal right on the Internet."
3. How Speech as a Means of Conveying an Idea and Speech as a
Commodiflable Object Become Entangled on the Digital Landscape
The information individuals disclose possesses ever-increasing
value, even as it becomes increasingly difficult to protect from
alienation. Platform providers may freely condition access and
participation on the disclosure and unrestricted right to use an
individual's private information.
more about ArbComm's function, structure, and practices, see generally David A.
Hoffman & Salil K. Mehra, Wikitruth Through Wikiorder, 59 EMORY L.J. 151, 154 (2009).
43. See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (alleging discrimination);
Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113-14 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (alleging
violation of American's with Disabilities Act because plaintiff suffers from bipolar
disorder); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 453-61 (2000) (calling status
discrimination "endemic" and content discrimination "far more prevalent" than status
discrimination).
44. Self-help remedies are easy for platforms to effectuate: simply delete or disable a
user's post or account. Such a deletion, if wrongful, would be a breach of contract or a
tort. But, under federal law, a user's failure to respect a platform's decision to restrict his
or her access to the platform is a federal crime. If a platform website tells an individual
they are banned for life and are forbidden to reestablish an account, a subsequent attempt
to access the platform violates the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which carries
penalties on the order of decades in prison. See Orin Kerr, More Thoughts on the Six
CFAA Scenarios About Authorized Access vs. Unauthorized Access, THE VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/28/more-thoughts-on-the-
six-cfaa-scenarios-about-authorized-access-vs-unauthorized-access (arguing with respect
to hypothetical #6, involving a "free social networking site in which users must register and
obtain an account" where a user creates a third account after having his account twice-
deleted, Professor Kerr writes "[tjhis is one is a little tricky, but I think it should be treated
as prohibited unauthorized access"); see also Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied:
Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly
Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 323-24, 331 (2004); Orin S. Kerr,
Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting "Access" and "Authorization" in Computer Misuse
Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1599-1600, 1644-60 (2003); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness
Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1578-83 (2010)
(discussing a case in which a prosecution was brought under the CFAA for violation of
MySpace's Terms of Service while noting that what was improper about the prosecution
was not that a platform provider can use the CFAA to enforce any access and use
restrictions it chooses, but rather that "no one actually treats TOS as if they govern access
rights").
45. See, e.g., Data Use Policy - Information We Receive About You, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
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One's deeply held beliefs, wants, desires, and needs cannot be
shared with others without also being appropriated by the
intermediary. 6 Even one's likeness may be appropriated for use in
platform marketing, promotion, and for use as a marketing tool to
one's closest friends and confidants.47 Moreover, these intensely
Facebook Privacy Policy] (explaining that Facebook collects and uses deep granular data
about you from you and from others and shares it with advertising partners); Privacy
Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy (last visited Nov. 19,
2013) [hereinafter Google Privacy Policy] (explaining that Google collects, stores, and
uses any information you input on a Google service including credit card and contact
information, and any information it can glean from your device, including geographic
location, tracking information, patters, habits, and demographics).
46. Facebook's enhanced search tool "graph search" is nearing deployment. The
company advertises an archetypical search as a search for "books my friends like." See
Paul Boutin, Search Tool on Facebook Puts Network to Work, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/technology/personaltech/facebooks-graph-
search-makes-use-of-friends-and-likes.html?pagewanted=all. There are more troubling
searches one might run. Forbes presented this list of actual searches:
1. "Current employers of people who like Racism"
2. "Spouses of married people who like ... Ashley Madison"
3. "Family members of people who live in China and like ... Falun Gong"
4. "Islamic men interested in men who live in Tehran, Iran"
5. "People who like Focus on the Family .. . and Neil Patrick Harris. . .
6. "Single women who live nearby and who are interested in men and like Getting
Drunk"
7. "Mothers of Catholics from Italy who like Durex"
See Kashmir Hill, Facebook Graph Search Shows You 'Married People Who Like
Prostitutes' and 'Employers of People Who Like Racism,' FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/01/23/facebook-graph-search-embarrassing.
While the author of the Forbes article argues that "[t]he exposure of this information in
this form isn't a matter of private information being breached; instead it's a matter of
obscurity being reduced," id., that is not quite right. It is not entirely clear that employers
are aware that their employees "Like" groups that have been tagged "racist" or that the
employees even know that the groups they have liked are so categorized.
47. Instagram changed its Terms of Service to clarify that it could freely share photos
used on the popular photo sharing website with Advertisers and others as it saw fit-
prompting an instant and enormous backlash. See Jenna Wortham & Nick Bilton, What
Instagram's New Terms of Service Mean for You, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2012), http://bits.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/what-instagrams-new-terms-of-service-mean-for-you ("You
could star in an advertisement-without your knowledge."). As a law firm analyzing the
Instagram controversy commented, Instagram-just like Yahoo!, Flickr, and other media
platforms-could already do that under the industry-standard Terms of Service. See
Intstagram-Why the Backlash?, MAYER BROWN (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.
mayerbrown.com/Instagram-why-the-backlash-03-11-2013 ("Instagram was given a
licence to exploit users' photos in just about any way imaginable .... This meant that
Instagram could already-before the December change-use non-private photos in its
own advertising."). The takeaway, it is suggested, is not to limit the scope of the Terms of
Service but to keep the Terms of Service as vague, broad, and as close to the industry-
standard terms as possible. Id.
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personal elements of individual identity can be subpoenaed, sold, and
freely disclosed by these third-party intermediaries.48
4. How Power over Content and Access Allows Platforms to
Expropriate Individual Speech
Even as information about individuals sweeps increasingly
beyond their control, the fruits of their creativity must be given away
as a condition of obtaining the privilege of access. Writings, photos,
videos, compositions, all belong as much to the platform provider as
to the artist, creator, or chronicler who set them down.49  Some
platforms go even further, conditioning participation and access on an
individual forever giving up all intellectual property entitlement to
the works she creates.o Creators are increasingly confronted with
48. See, e.g., Google Privacy Policy, supra note 45 (explaining that Google freely
shares "non-personally identifiable information publicly and with our partners" and also
shares whatever it knows whenever such sharing is, inter alia, incidental to a legal
proceeding of almost any kind, necessary to resolve "technical issues," and/or to protect
Google's or other Google customers' "property").
49. See, e.g., Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Facebook
Terms of Service] ("For content that is covered by intellectual property rights, like photos
and videos (IP content), you specifically give us the following permission, subject to your
privacy and application settings: you grant us a non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable,
royalty-free, worldwide license to use any IP content that you post on or in connection
with Facebook (IP License)."); YouTube Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, http://www.
youtube.com/static?template=terms (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) [hereinafter YouTube
Terms of Service] ("[B]y submitting Content to YouTube, you hereby grant YouTube a
worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable license to use,
reproduce, distribute, prepare derivative works of, display, and perform the Content in
connection with the Service and YouTube's (and its successors' and affiliates') business,
including without limitation for promoting and redistributing part or all of the Service
(and derivative works thereof) in any media formats and through any media channels.");
see also Carmit Soliman, Remixing Sharing: Sharing Platforms As A Tool for Advancement
of UGC Sharing, 22 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 279, 293-306 (2012) (explaining that
YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, MySpace, and Blogger all ascribe to the industry practice of
"issu[ing] themselves licenses to use [User Generated Content]").
50. See Wikipedia Terms of Use, WIKIPEDIA, http://wikimediafoundation.org/wiki/
Terms-of_Use (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Wikipedia Terms of Service]
("[A]ll users contributing to the Projects are required to grant broad permissions to the
general public to re-distribute and re-use their contributions freely . . .. When you submit
text to which you hold the copyright, you agree to license it under: Creative Commons
Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License ("CC BY-SA"), and GNU Free
Documentation License ("GFDL") (unversioned, with no invariant sections, front-cover
texts, or back-cover texts)."). This licensing requirement-which is effectively an
agreement to renounce one's claims to any copyright over her creations-applies to
content contributed to any and all WikiMedia platform projects. See id. ("No revocation
of license: Except as consistent with your license, you agree that you will not unilaterally
revoke or seek invalidation of any license that you have granted under these Terms of Use
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difficult choices about the cost of losing control of their creations and
the cost of losing access to an audience.
B. The Importance of Control of Information
How important is control over information to the total social,
commercial and political life of the nation? As of 2012, there were
2.4 billion Internet users worldwide, with 274 million in North
America." Of the United States population, 84% of adults are
Internet users.52 Facebook had 1 billion active users, while Twitter
had 200 million, and Google saw 135 million monthly active users on
its social network Google+." There were 1.2 trillion Google searches,
and Google held 67% of the U.S. search market.54 There were 2.7
billion Facebook likes each day, and 24.3% of the top 10,000 websites
were integrated with Facebook.5 ' Facebook saw 300 million photos
added each day, for a total of 7 petabytes of photos each month.
Four billion hours of video were watched on YouTube each month,
and 181.7 million Americans watched online videos in December of
2012."
Life in all its particulars is increasingly integrated with the
Internet and increasingly lensed through powerful platforms. As of
2010, the average person visited 2,646 web pages across 89 domains
each month." The most visited sites, however, were visited by an
astounding proportion of these users: 82% visited Google, 62%
for text content or non-text media contributed to the Wikimedia Projects or features, even
if you terminate use of our services.").
51. Internet 2012 in Numbers, PINGDOM (Jan. 16, 2013), http://royal.pingdom.com/
2013/01/16/Internet-2012-in-numbers.
52. Frederic Lardinois, Forrester: 84% Of U.S. Adults Now Use The Web Daily, 50%
Own Smartphones, Tablet Ownership Doubled To 19% In 2012, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 19,
2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/12/19/forrester-84-of-u-s-adults-now-use-the-web-daily-
50-own-smartphones-tablet-ownership-doubled-to-19-in-2012. A "user" is defined as one
who visits the Internet at least once a month. Id. Eighty-four percent of those 245 million
users, however, access the Internet daily. Id.
53. Internet 2012, supra note 51.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. (For those visiting this footnote from Footnote 36, the answer is Noon at the
Ticket Booth in the Grand Central Terminal.).
57. Id.
58. How the World Spends its Time Online, VISUAL ECONOMics, http://www.
creditioan.com/blog/how-the-world-spends-its-time-online/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).
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visited Bing, 54% visited Facebook, 53% visited Yahoo!, 48% visited
Microsoft, 47% visited YouTube, and 35% visited Wikipedia.
The average American spends approximately 30 hours a month
online. Social networking accounts for 20.1% of the time, while
8.1% was spent on online games, 5.2% on video and movies, 3.2% on
search, and 7.1% on email.61 The average Facebook user spends
seven hours each month on Facebook.62  One hundred and five
million Americans watch online videos each day, 6 and the average
YouTube viewer watches five hours of videos each month.64
American adults now spend as much time on their mobile devices as
they do reading newspapers and magazines. As of 2009, Americans
were estimated to consume 34 gigabytes of information each day.'
Multiplayer videogames are now a significant part of American
social life. In 2011, the U.S. market alone was worth $2.12 billion and
was comprised of roughly 47 million users (about 15% of the U.S.
population).67 Roughly 20 million individuals subscribe to Massively
Multiplayer Online Role Playing Games (persistent virtual worlds).
59. Id.
60. Sarah Perez, Nielsen: TV Still King in Media Consumption; Only 16 Percent of TV
Homes Have Tablets, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 7, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/07/
nielsen-tv-still-king-in-media-consumption-only-16-percent-of-tv-homes-have-tablets.
61. Id.
62. Josh Constine, People Are Facebook'ing-and-Buying More Than Ever, Even If
They Don't Realize 11, TECHCRUNCH (June 6, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/06/06/
facebooking/.
63. Josh Constine, 100 Million Americans Watch Online Video Per Day, Up 43%
Since 2010 -comScore, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 9, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/02/09/
I 00-million-american-watch-video/.
64. Leena Rao, comScore: The Average YouTube Viewer Watches 5 Hours Of Videos
A Month, TECHCRUNCH (June 17, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/06/17/comscore-the-
average-youtube-viewer-watches-5-hours-of-videos-a-month.
65. Erick Schonfeld, People Spend As Much Time On Mobile As Reading
Newspapers And Magazines, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 15, 2010), http://techcrunch.com
/2010/12/15/time-mobile-newspapers. Americans also now spend more time on Facebook
Mobile than Facebook's website. Josh Constine, Americans Now Spend More Time On
Facebook Mobile Than Its Website, TECHCRUNCH (May 11, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/
2012/05/1 1/time-spent-on-facebook-mobile.
66. Nicholas DeLeon, Study: Americans consume 34 gigabytes of information per day,
TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 9, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/12/09/study-americans-consume
-34-gigabytes-of-information-per-day.
67. Graphs MMO Revenues, GAMESINDUSTRY.COM, http://archive.is/EvwFw (last
visited Dec. 4, 2013).
68. See Total MMORPG Subscriptions and Active Accounts Listed on This Site,
MMODATA.NET, http://users.telenet.be/mmodata/Charts/TotalSubs.png (last visited Nov.
19, 2013).
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The economic significance of the time and resources Americans
spend in these worlds can be crudely approximated by the black
market for their in-game currencies. In 2009 alone, this was a billion
dollar industry employing 400,000 people in Asia.69
In 2011, the top five most-pirated PC games-Crysis 2, Call of
Duty: Modern Warfare 3, Battlefield 3, FIFA 12, and Portal 2-were
each downloaded more than three million times.o At least three of
these games-Crisis 2, Call of Duty, and Battlefield-are primarily
multiplayer games. As of 2009, the average gamer spent anywhere
between fifteen and nineteen hours per week playing videogames."
In 2012, the average Xbox owner spent four and a half hours per
week using the console.72
Transactions on the Internet now account for, or contribute to, a
significant portion of all commercial activity in the United States.
Over $1 trillion in U.S. commercial transactions were web-influenced
in 2010, and that number is expected to grow to over $1.4 trillion by
2014." Total U.S. Internet commerce will be $231 billion in 2013.74
Amazon alone will account for roughly $80 billion of those sales."
69. Nicholas DeLeon, Let's quit our jobs and become World of Warcraft gold farmers,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 6, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/03/06/lets-quit-our-jobs-and-
become-world-of-warcraft-gold-farmers. One might also note that Blizzard's $1 billion in
subscription revenue in 2007 equaled one-eighth of the movie industry's total revenue that
year. Peter J. Quinn, A Click Too Far: The Difficulty in Using Adhesive American Law
License Agreements to Govern Global Virtual Worlds, 27 WIS. INT'L L.J. 757,769 (2010).
70. Ernesto, Call of Duty: Black Ops Most Pirated Game of 2010, TORRENTFREAK
(Dec. 28, 2010), http://torrentfreak.com/call-of-duty-black-ops-most-pirated-game-of-2010-
101228.
71. Nicholas DeLeon, Is the Recession Causing People to Play More and More Video
Games?, TECHCRUNCH (July 7, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/07/07/is-the-recession-
causing-people-to-play-more-and-more-video-games.
72. See Tadhg Kelly, What Games Are: The "Beyond Games" Mirage, TECH CRUNCH
(Feb. 17, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/02/17/what-games-are-the-beyond-games-
mirage.
73. Erick Schonfeld, Forrester Forecast: Online Retail Sales Will Grow to $250 Billion
by 2014, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 8, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/03/08/forrester-
forecast-online-retail-sales-will-grow-to-250-billion-by-2014.
74. See Natasha Lomas, Forrester: U.S. Online Retail Sales to Rise to $370BN by 2017
(10% CAGR) as Ecommerce Motors on With Help From Tablets and Phones,
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 13, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/03/13/forrester-2012-2017-
ecommerce-forecast.
75. See Leena Rao, Amazon Misses: Q4 Sales Up 22 Percent to $21.3B, Net Income
Down 45 Percent to $97M, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 29, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/
29/amazon-misses-q4-sales-up-22-percent-to-21-3b-net-income-down-45-percent-to-97m;
Rip Empson, WTF: Amazon Barely Ekes Out Profit on $21B in Sales, Hits Negative P/E,
Misses Estimates, Guidance, Yet Stock Jumps 10%, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/29/wtf-amazon-barely-ekes-out-profit-on-21 b-in-sales-hits-
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eBay and Paypal expect to do $20 billion in mobile commerce in
2013." Marc Andreessen, co-founder of Netscape, predicts that
eventually e-commerce will eliminate traditional brick-and-mortar
commerce entirely."
As more of social, political, and economic life pours onto the
Internet and onto these centralized platforms, it becomes more
essential to join and participate in them. The Internet is not a
complement to the ordinary incidents of democratic life so much as a
substitute for them. Every hour spent in a virtual world is an hour
outside the real one. And, as ordinary civic organizations lose critical
mass, the center of gravity is shifting to the Internet. While it is true
that the Internet offers enormous opportunities to discover
thousands, even millions, of others with whom to discuss, to debate,
and to share, it is difficult to regard this choice as entirely volitional.
The places to participate and engage must be taken as they are; no
individual can join the network on her own terms.
Control over data and access to knowledge will necessarily
assume ever-greater importance as we move closer to a mature
information society. The question is: Who will ultimately be
responsible for ensuring and safeguarding the sanctity of individual
self-determination and freedom in this society, whatever its ultimate
form? This responsibility must be carried by some entity committed
to individual dignity, equality, and liberty. It cannot be left solely to
platform owners to sustain."
negative-pe-misses-estimates-guidance-yet-stock-jumps-10 ("Amazon is the Walmart of
the Internet.").
76. Leena Rao, eBay and PayPal Expect to Do $20 Billion Each in 2013 Mobile
Commerce, TECHCRUNCH (Jan 16, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/16/ebay-and-
paypal-expect-to-do-20-billion-each-in-2013-mobile-commerce/.
77. Sarah Lacy, Andreessen Predicts the Death of Traditional Retail. Yes: Absolute
Death, PANDODAILY (Jan. 30, 2013), http://pandodaily.com/2013/01/30/andreessen-
predicts-the-death-of-traditional-retail-yes-absolute-death.
78. See Rachel Whetstone, Free Expression and Controversial Content on the Web,
GOOGLE: OFFICIAL BLOG (Nov. 14, 2007), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2007/11/free-
expression-and-controversial.html ("Google is not, and should not become, the arbiter of
what does and does not appear on the web. That's for the courts and those elected to
government to decide."), accord Rachel Whetstone, Our Approach to Free Expression and
Controversial Content, GOOGLE: OFFICIAL BLOG (Mar. 9, 2012), http://googleblog.
blogspot.com/2012/03/our-approach-to-free-expression-and.html ("Four years ago we first
outlined our approach to removing content from Google products and services. Nothing
has changed since then . . . .").
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C. The Control of Information and the Changing Forms of Power
The significance of control over information is magnified by
certain underlying changes in computing technology. Large increases
in processing power, data storage capacity, and bandwidth give rise to
several phenomena new to human experience. First is the
granulation of access, privilege, and interaction. Not only can a
content controller now limit the uses of any particular piece of media
to an unprecedented degree-to one individual, one time-more
significantly, one may now be treated as an individual in all one's
interactions with the platform. With the loss of generality comes the
accompanying loss of the protections afforded by that generality.
Alone without the crowd, an individual now encounters the network
as an individual woman, a system that already knows an enormous
amount about her, and vastly outmatches her knowledge and
processing capacity in crafting its decisions and shaping her
experience. A single speaker is more easily targeted, and given
platform providers' control over access, it is no longer possible to be
an anonymous speaker or faceless member of a crowd.
Second is the separation of formal legal entitlement and actual
entitlement-the separation, in some sense, of ownership from
control. On one side, technological advances increasingly render an
individual's technical ownership over content or data functionally
irrelevant, as worldwide, transferable licenses are granted to
platforms possessing far greater capacity to make use of that content
and data than any generic individual might. One is frequently given
"choices"-to opt out, to control one's information, to see all sides, to
bargain-that are entirely illusory. On the other side, platform
owners need never part with control over the content they provide.
Platform owners can take matters into their own hands to an
unprecedented degree without the need for recourse to any kind of
legal arbiter. Software and media can be remotely deleted. Access
can be instantaneously denied.
These are the phenomena legal scholars often describe when
they ominously portend the implications of "Code" for the future of
digital regulation.79 These Code-based interventions are frequently
far more powerful than any formal legal entitlements. Hypothetical
rights to bargain over contracts ring hollow in a digital ecosystem in
which using the network's most basic features requires investing one's
79. See LESSIG, supra note 18; see also JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNET AND How TO STOP IT (2008) (describing a future of closed platforms and
"tethered" information appliances).
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trust in a major media platform. Rights against discrimination,
manipulation, deception, and defamation mean little when one
cannot detect or deter their violation.
Power in our society is moving toward these platforms, enhanced
by emergent technologies, and controlled by corporate entities. To
the individual, these new forms of power increasingly shape the very
roots of her experience. To the child of the digital age, it is as if it has
always been so. Perhaps most importantly, the formal relationship
between these technologies and judicial protections for freedom of
expression means that the First Amendment increasingly protects
these platforms from government regulation.
II. The Emerging System of Law
Power is a product of control, and can be shaped by legal
institutions. While control over data, access, knowledge, and
information clearly constitutes a new kind of power, law may be able
to counter such power. But, if it is also "speech," then it is beyond
intervention. The question that arises is whether the control and
manipulation of information, words, images, and other media is
necessarily "speech." This section seeks to understand how courts
and legal and political actors, both formally and functionally, regard
the control these platforms exert. The goal is to understand, as far as
possible, the unique legal system that is emerging.
A. What Is Speech
The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts increasingly
view speech as anything which is formally, analogically, or
functionally equivalent to traditional speech. That is, if a type of
content looks like speech in a traditional form, is analogous to speech
in a traditional form, or is the functional equivalent of speech in a
traditional form, it is speech for purposes of the First Amendment.
1. Similar in Form to Traditional Speech
The earliest speech opinions emphasized literal similarities
between what happens on a computer and off. These opinions held
that computer code was speech because it was composed of words.'
80. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 447-49 (2d Cir. 2001);
Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484-85 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that computer source code
is speech because "though unintelligible to many, [it] is the preferred method of
communication among computer programmers"); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 176
F.3d 1132, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that such speech is protected), rev'd en banc, 192
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They emphasized that computer source code was merely a technical
form of communication, much like what might be found in a scientific
publication or a recipe. Once it was first decided that computer
source code was speech because it was composed of a kind of
specialized language, nearly every federal court joined in that
rationale." Courts have found that both the executable object code-
which even human beings trained in the use of computers have great
difficulty deciphering-as well as the more readable source code, are
both speech meriting First Amendment protection.
One case has held to the contrary. In Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Vartuli, the program was to be operated
"mechanically" and "without the intercession of the mind or the will
of the recipient." 83 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, "the
fact that the system used words as triggers and a human being as a
conduit, rather than programming commands as triggers and
semiconductors as a conduit, appears to us to be irrelevant for
purposes of this analysis."" This case is something of an outlier,
however, and has not been followed."
2. Analogous to Traditional Speech
Nearly two decades after the lower federal courts began to
grapple with the question of what counts as speech on a computer,
the Supreme Court weighed in. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Association, the Supreme Court held that videogames are speech
because they convey information in a manner analogous to works of
literature.8 ' This was an approach endorsed and explained by Judge
F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999), appeal later dismissed; United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp.
2d 1111, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C.
1996) (reasoning that "computer language source codes ... are comprehensible to human
beings when viewed on a personal computer"); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of State, 922 F.
Supp. 1426, 1434-36 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that computer source code is speech
because it comprises a set of specialized instructions).
81. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 80.
82. See 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1099
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (describing and following the holdings of other federal courts on the issue).
83. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94, 111 (2d Cir. 2000).
84. Id.
85. See IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 2010) (Livingston, J.,
dissenting) (lamenting the Second Circuit's hostility to Vartuli, reasoning "[1]anguage
serves a variety of functions, only some of which are covered by the special reasons for
freedom of speech" (quoting Vartuli, 228 F.3d at 111)).
86. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011); see also Andrew
Tutt, Software Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 75 (2012) ("Rather than reach
beyond video games to software generally, the Court zeroed in on video games and held
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Richard Posner in the Seventh Circuit almost ten years earlier in
American Amusement Machines Association v. Kendrick, and the
Supreme Court adopted his rationale almost in terms." More than
simply analogizing videogames to works of literature, the Supreme
Court seemed to announce a rule that it would take an analogical
approach wherever possible, proclaiming "the basic principles of
freedom of speech ... do not vary when a new and different medium
for communication appears."8
At least one lower federal court has endorsed the analogical
approach, holding that blog posts and tweets are analogous to
"Colonial bulletin boards."89
3. Functionally Equivalent to Traditional Speech
The most significant and potentially revolutionary decision in the
area of digital speech, however, is not-at least on its face-a decision
involving digital speech at all." In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the
Supreme Court announced that "the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment."91
Sorrell considered whether the government could place
restrictions on who could receive and use information about
physicians' prescription practices in Vermont.' The Court found that
the Vermont statute barring the sale, disclosure, and use of such
information for marketing purposes imposed both content- and
speaker-based restrictions on protected speech.93 The Court was
that they were speech because they communicated ideas through familiar literary
devices.").
87. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 2001)
(striking down a similar restriction on violent video games).
88. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
503 (1952)).
89. United States v. Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577-78 (D. Md. 2011), appeal
dismissed (Apr. 11, 2012).
90. Sorrell, the case principally discussed in this section, is not necessarily novel or an
unexpected departure. Over ten years before Sorrell, the Tenth Circuit arrived at a similar
conclusion. See U.S. W., Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that
Customer Proprietary Network Information is speech).
91. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011). The Court explained:
"Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that is most essential to
advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong argument
that prescriber-identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes." Id.
92. See id. at 2659.
93. See id. at 2667.
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particularly troubled that such information could be sold or even
given away as long as it was not sold to a proscribed entity or for a
proscribed purpose. 94 Given the case's somewhat idiosyncratic facts,
it is tempting to see Sorrell as a case that has little relevance to the
Court's understanding of what counts as speech online. Indeed, it is
tempting to argue that the Court in Sorrell "could not have possibly
meant what it said" and that the language the Court chose was simply
a rhetorical flourish," or was perhaps too sweeping.
Close scrutiny of the case and its history, however, reveals the
opposite. The litigants and judges in Sorrell seemed to understand
the digital-speech ramifications of the Court's decision. In the case
below the two most important precedents over which the majority
and dissenting opinions divided were Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley and Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Vartuli-two
cases about whether and when a software program is speech."
In addition, the Supreme Court's finding that data in its rawest
and most inarticulate form is speech has sweeping ramifications for
online speech even if only by analogy. While economic regulations
frequently restrict the usage of products and services, the First
Amendment prohibits the government from engaging in such content
discrimination when speech is at stake. Thus, as Justice Stephen
Breyer noted in his dissent, the Court's holding protects information
at such a high level of generality that even if one cannot articulate the
medium or the message, as long as a litigant can reasonably make out
a claim that what the government seeks to regulate is information
because it is information, it becomes protected speech.9
Moreover, even as Sorrell may appear on its face unrelated to the
question of what counts as speech in the digital realm, the case has
been received as a watershed with important ramifications for digital
speech. As Google has begun to enlist advocates to lay a foundation
for a First Amendment defense to intervention for anticompetitive
94. See id. at 2662.
95. See Tutt, supra note 86, at 74 (arguing that the Court's holding in Sorrell is "so
broad and potentially far-reaching that the Court could not possibly have literally meant
what it said"). For a discussion of the facts and holding in Sorrell, see id. at 75-76.
96. See IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Corley for
the proposition that "computer program is speech" in support of its holding); id. at 287-88
(Livingston, J., dissenting) (discussing Corley and Vartuli at length). See also supra note 80
and accompanying text.
97. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2673-77, 2680-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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search rankings," Sorrell has appeared and reappeared. In a White
Paper that has now become an article entitled Google: First
Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, Eugene
Volokh and his co-author Donald Falk prominently cited Sorrell on
the way to concluding that Google Search results cannot be
regulated.' Neal Katyal, former acting solicitor general and the
United States' advocate in Sorrell, argues that Sorrell represents a
seminal case-one that means Google is likely to win on a First
Amendment defense should the government seek to bring an
antitrust action against the company."
4. The Puzzle of the Courts' Approaches
There is a puzzle in each of the three approaches the courts have
adopted-deciding what is and isn't speech based on whether it is
literally like speech, analogous to speech, or is information-and the
puzzle is that none of them take much account of what makes speech
special. The sections of the opinions awarding information and
videogames the privilege of denotation as "speech" under the First
Amendment were minimal.o' The approaches advanced in the
earliest opinions protecting computer code, relying on the fact that
computer programs are literally instructions, were not much better.'o2
While videogames are like literature because they have the
capacity to engage our deepest emotions, many courts have held that
other kinds of games and meaningful hobbies possess no similar First
Amendment status.0a And, while information may be important and
98. See Josh Blackman, Professor Eugene Volokh, the Advocate, JOSH BLACKMAN'S
BLOG (May 21, 2012), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/05/21/professor-eugene-volokh-
the-advocate.
99. EUGENE VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, GOOGLE: FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION FOR SEARCH ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS 13 (2012), reprinted in 8 J.L.
ECON. & POL'Y 883, 890 (2012).
100. Kirsten Downey, Google Pondering First Amendment Defense, FTC:WATCH No.
810, at 2-3 (July 2, 2012).
101. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667; Brown v. Entm't Merchants Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729,
2733 (2011).
102. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 447-49 (2d Cir. 2001).
103. See, e.g., City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (recreational dancing);
There to Care, Inc. v. Comm'r of Ind. Dep't of Revenue, 19 F.3d 1165, 1167 (7th Cir. 1994)
(bingo); AK Tournament Play, Inc. v. Town of Wallkill, No. 09-CV-10579 (LAP), 2011
WL 197216, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2011) (poker), aff'd, 444 F. App'x 475 (2d Cir. 2011);
Lamle v. City of Santa Monica, No. 04-CV-6355-GHK (SH), 2010 WL 3734868, at *7-10,
n.19 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2010) (Farook), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL
3734864 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2010); Fox v. Blades, No. CVO6-96-S-BLW, 2006 WL
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facts may be the beginning point of much human knowledge,
"everything is 'an expressive means for the exchange of information
and ideas' about itself, and this is just as true in realspace as in
cyberspace.""
Years ago, in a concurrence in Miller v. South Bend, Judge
Posner suggested that the labels "expression versus nonexpression,
ideas versus emotions, art versus entertainment, or speech versus
conduct" were all just "lawyers' classification games.""' Cultural
values determine the First Amendment's scope and protections.'O
This principle, that the cultural position of a particular sphere of
action or medium of expression should determine its entitlement to
First Amendment protection, would seem to be a better way of
deciding these questions than any of the courts' current approaches.'*
B. Platform Providers' Rights to Control and Discriminate
As the commercial and political power of platforms has grown,
there have been increasing skirmishes in the courts over the rights of
platform owners to control, edit, and discriminate as they see fit.'"
1. Automated Opinions
The emerging law understands automated content discrimination
as the expression of opinion, rather than simple commercial conduct.
Two federal court decisions have held that search results, including
the choices of what to include in those results, are "speech" fully
protected by the First Amendment.'" Another federal court has
1006802, at *1 (D. Idaho Apr. 14, 2006) ("hobbycraft"); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton,
898 F. Supp. 192,195 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (boxing), affd, 95 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 1996).
104. Orin Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation Internet
Law, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287,1291 (2000) (emphasis in original).
105. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1100 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
106. Id.; Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1255 (1995) ("To summarize the argument so far: First Amendment analysis is relevant
only when the values served by the First Amendment are implicated. These values do not
attach to abstract acts of communication as such, but rather to the social contexts that
envelop and give constitutional significance to acts of communication.").
107. See id. at 1275-76; Tutt, supra note 86.
108. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech:
Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1439, 1453-
56 (2011).
109. See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007) ("The
First Amendment guarantees an individual the right to free speech, 'a term necessarily
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say....' [T]he injunctive
relief sought by Plaintiff contravenes Defendants' First Amendment rights."); Search
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found that software that informs users that they have malware on
their computer, and offers to facilitate its deletion, "is a form of
speech" analogous to the expression of an opinion."
2. The State Action Principle
A platform's right to engage in content discrimination begins at
the moment one engages the platform. The federal courts are
unanimous: Platform providers are not "quasi-public utilities" nor
"places of public accommodation" and they cannot be sued for
engaging in content-discrimination under a theory that the First
Amendment applies to them."'
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has gone further, recognizing
that 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) protects media companies from ordinary
commercial and tort-based liability for content-based censorship.H2
The Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of Section 230(c)(2)
King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D.
Okla. May 27, 2003) (Google's ranking decisions are "constitutionally protected opinions"
that are "entitled to full constitutional protection.").
110. See New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1081-83 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see
also New.Net, Inc. v. Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1098, 1110-13 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(finding that the software's "speech" was not only not commercial speech, but was speech
on a matter of public concern).
111. Howard v. Am. Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Plaintiffs counter
that AOL is a 'quasi-public utility....' There is nothing in the record that supports the
contention that AOL should be considered a state actor."); see also Thomas v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 176 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding domain name assignment is not
State action); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(finding Facebook is not a "place of public accommodation"); Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F.
Supp. 2d 577, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding Yahoo! Could not be held accountable for
censoring political messages in the run-up to a gubernatorial election); Noah v. AOL Time
Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that AOL's warnings and
account termination, even if done simply to suppress plaintiffs pro-Islamic statements,
were unreachable because AOL is not a state actor); Island Online, Inc. v. Network
Solutions, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that defendant's policy
of filtering out certain domain names did not violate the First Amendment because
domain name assignment is not state action); Sanger v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 151, 163
(E.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Because these Internet providers are not state actors, they are free to
impose content-based restrictions on access to the Internet without implicating the First
Amendment."); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 443-44
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that AOL is not a state actor).
112. The statute immunizes from liability providers and users of interactive computer
services who voluntarily make good faith efforts to restrict access to material they consider
to be objectionable. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012); see also Balkin, supra note 18, at 434
& n.31 ("Section 230 is by no means a perfect piece of legislation; it may be overprotective
in some respects and underprotective in others .... Section 230(2), for example, gives
conduit owners complete discretion to censor traffic in addition to the section 230(1)
immunity.").
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immunity in the face of a First Amendment challenge to the statute,
reasoning that the First Amendment does not prohibit blanket
immunity from suit over private censorship."' The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals emphasized that in the treatment of users' speech,
platform companies are not bound to the same First Amendment
requirements of nondiscrimination and even-handedness as the
government is."4
3. Code as Conduct
Even as platform controllers and discriminators have obtained
protection from regulation because their automated content-
discrimination merely expresses an opinion, those who have sought to
spread programs and program code that can subvert and circumvent
restrictions designed to protect intellectual property have found no
friend in the First Amendment. Federal courts, in the same opinions
in which they recognize that code is speech, have just as readily
sanctioned it for violating otherwise neutral, generally applicable
laws."'
4. Utility as Speech
To the extent there is a unifying principle, it would seem it is an
economic one-a notion that the speech that counts is speech that is
economically useful. The business torts brought against Google,
Microsoft, Yahoo!, and Lavasoft were otherwise indistinguishable
from the claims brought against the individuals who posted code and
linked to potentially infringing copyrighted material in Corley and
Elcom. Yet, there is no mention of the speech-conduct distinction, or
of a lower standard of scrutiny, in LavaSoft, Langdon, or Search
King-the cases calling algorithmic outputs opinions. The harms in
the latter three cases were not rooted in the persuasive power of the
"speech" at issue, but that Google made it more difficult to find the
plaintiffs' websites in its search results, and that Ad-Aware facilitated
the deletion of the plaintiffs' spyware.
113. See Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003) ("AOL is a
private, for profit company and is not subject to constitutional free speech guarantees.").
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 454-56 (2d Cir.
2001); United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1128-32 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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5. Emanations from Outside the Digital Realm
The Supreme Court and at least one lower federal court are
engaged in a project of remodeling the First Amendment. The
penumbra of this project will influence decisions with respect to
online platforms. In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court
announced that false and misleading speech is now on a plane of
protection similar to ordinary speech."' The Court argued that the
kinds of false speech that can be regulated are limited in number, that
one must have a mens rea before the government may punish false
speech, and that the cure for false and misleading statements is not
restrictions on such statements but the speech correcting them.m'
Alvarez is a strong libertarian opinion, but its implications for the
digital realm-where deception and manipulation are automated,
difficult to detect, and tempting to engage in-are potentially far-
reaching.
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration will also
reverberate in the digital realm."' There, the court held that the
FDA's tobacco labeling requirements violated the First Amendment
by compelling speech."9 While the case perhaps makes more sense in
the physical world-where a variety of non-speech remedies can be
crafted to counteract harmful commercial conduct-in the digital
world, where every intervention must necessarily burden what a
platform can say and how it can say it, the case and its progeny may
erect a powerful barrier to intervention.20
C. Control of Information and the Power of Government
As the notion of what counts as protected speech grows, the
power of government to intervene in the online ecosystem diminishes.
This diminished power is moderated further by the literal similarities
between the old speech and the new, the explicit protections from suit
over content censorship provided by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), and the
116. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012).
117. See id. at 2545, 2549-50; see also id. at 2546 ("This opinion... rejects the notion
that false speech should be in a general category that is presumptively unprotected.").
118. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
119. Id. at 1217-22.
120. The Supreme Court's cases may already erect a significant barrier to remedies to
content discrimination. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(holding that the remedy for critical speech cannot be a requirement that newspapers print
a reply tendered by the person criticized).
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contractual agreements to which all individuals must submit to make
use of Internet platforms at all. In the face of these obstacles, what
powers does government have? There are, it seems, two: fiction and
discretion.
1. Ordinary Limitations on the Powers of Government
It first bears mentioning that courts have not relinquished their
traditional role as guardians of the First Amendment where that role
remains clear. As more traditional speech has moved onto the
Internet, the courts have continued to carefully police government-
sponsored content and viewpoint discrimination. Federal courts
nationwide have struck down limits on sex-offenders' access to digital
tools such as social networking websites, instant messaging software,
and chat programs. 121  They have treated Facebook posts, MySpace
profiles, Tweets, and Blogs as written published opinions
disseminated to a narrow or a general audience as determined by
their context.'22 Even the odd case of Bland v. Roberts, which has
received much coverage in the media-a decision that could be taken
to hold that Facebook "likes" are not entitled to First Amendment
protection at all-is not as crude as media accounts have suggested.'3
The decision, rather, seems to hold that a Facebook "like" is not
speech "on a matter of public concern" as the Supreme Court's First
Amendment retaliation jurisprudence requires.124 In the Bland
121. See Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion Cnty., Ind., 705 F.3d 694, 697-99 (7th Cir. 2013);
Doe v. Nebraska, 8:09CV456, 2012 WL 4923131 (D. Neb. Oct. 17, 2012); Doe v. Jindal, 853
F. Supp. 2d 596, 604-06 (M.D. La. 2012). But see generally United States v. Collins, 11-
CR-00471-DLJ PSG, 2012 WL 3537814 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2012) (upholding limits of use
of Twitter and IRC as conditions of release pending trial).
122. See, e.g., Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207-09
(3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (U.S. 2012) (holding that a student's MySpace
profile was entitled to First Amendment protection); United States v. Cassidy, 814 F.
Supp. 2d 574, 576-78, 582-84 (D. Md. 2011) (holding that blog posts and tweets are to be
generally regarded publicly expressed opinions, not private communications).
123. Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012). Media accounts of the
case indicate that the Court found that a Facebook "like" is not expressive for First
Amendment purposes at all. See, e.g., The Associated Press, Clicking 'Like' on Facebook
Is Not Protected Speech, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/06/us/clicking-like-on-facebook-is-not-protected-speech-judge-rules.html.
124. The cases cited by the court in Bland and the specific context of the case make
clear that the court was deciding as to whether the speech rose to the level of a comment
on a matter of public concern. See Bland, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 603-04. This is a heightened
showing of importance that lower courts have interpreted Supreme Court jurisprudence to
require. See also Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (conditioning First
Amendment protection from retaliation on the Speech's relevance to a matter of "public
concern").
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court's defense, other courts across the nation have found that
significantly more "speech-like" speech than a Facebook "like" has
also failed to meet this burden.125
2. The Magnification of Governmental Power by Executive Discretion
The federal government's competition and consumer protection
agencies have begun to emerge as the Internet's speech regulators.1 26
With the First Amendment looming over them, and with the much-
lauded and highly protective 47 U.S.C. § 230 against them,127 these
regulators route-around difficult questions of whether content
discrimination by powerful platforms is "speech." They employ
competition, consumer protection, and privacy enforcement powers
to effectuate what are essentially First Amendment values. This
lends these agencies wide discretion-and thereby great power-over
what content decisions media platforms make while they evade
judicial scrutiny.
The way these agencies-most prominently the Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC")m'-regulate the new speech is by moving the
questions from what counts as "speech" to what counts as deception
125. See generally Lalack v. Oregon, 3:11-CV-01285-BR, 2013 WL 819789 (D. Or.
Mar. 5, 2013) (holding that employee's report of Facebook activities of other employees
was not speech on a matter of public concern sufficient to form the basis of a retaliation
claim); Velazquez v. Autonomous Municipality of Carolina, CIV. 11-1586 SEC, 2012 WL
6552789 (D.P.R. Dec. 14, 2012) (holding that plaintiff's Facebook posts criticizing the
Police Department may rise to the level of speech on a matter of public concern, but that
there was not enough evidence to rule on the issue at the pleading stage, making it a
contested issue of material fact); Gresham v. City of Atlanta, 1:10-CV-1301-RWS, 2011
WL 4601020 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2011) adhered to on reconsideration, 1:10-CV-1301-RWS,
2012 WL 1600439 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2012) (holding that plaintiff's Facebook post related
to a matter of public concern, but commenting that the court "considers this a close
question").
126. At least in the United States. See Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1807, 1820 (2012) ("The most significant effort to modify Facebook's policies by the
U.S. government occurred in December 2011, when the Federal Trade Commission
('FTC') sought to resolve a complaint against Facebook for its privacy practices.");
Alexandra Paslawsky, The Growth of Social Media Norms and Governments' Attempts at
Regulation, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1485, 1494-95, 1517-20 (2012) (describing the efforts
of the FTC and FCC); Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of Association:
Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371, 1382-83 (2012).
127. See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
933, 943 (2008) (lauding 47 U.S.C. § 230's protections and extolling its importance).
128. Though the FCC and other federal agencies-even the State Department-have
involved themselves in an important way. See, e.g., Jacob Michael Kaufman, G2G, Yo
Quiero TB: Taco Bell Found Not Liable for Franchisee Text Message Campaign,
SOCIALLYAWARE (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2012/09/06/g2g-yo-
quiero-tb-taco-bell-found-not-liable-for-franchisee-text-message-campaign.
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and unfairness.129 These regulators are invested with the power to
define these words.'o Their authority to dictate the speech of
individuals and platform companies is, therefore, broad. It is a
violation of the FTC's guidelines for a platform company to engage in
content discrimination that is favorable to a marketing partner
without disclosure."' The FTC scrutinizes these companies' business
practices under the guise of antitrust scrutiny, and negotiates consent
decrees requiring structural actions that significantly affect how these
platforms structure user speech and experiences.'32 The FTC recently
investigated Twitter's restrictions on data use by platform application
developers, sending a message to social networking companies of the
costs of such practices.' The FTC has obtained consent decrees from
Facebook, Google, and Twitter requiring that they not employ
consumer data in ways the FTC deems unfair and deceptive-
effectively imposing direct regulations on how such data is used.134
The FTC held Google accountable for Google Buzz, not because
Google committed any particular tort for its negligent handling of
users' private information, but for violating its own privacy policy,
thus engaging in what the FTC characterized as a deceptive trade
129. See William McGeveran, Disclosure, Endorsement, and Identity in Social
Marketing, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1134-58 (2009) (describing these as "paradigmatic
legal responses").
130. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 511-12 (1989).
131. See FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2011); see also Julie Brill, Privacy & Consumer Protection
in Social Media, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1295, 1306-07 (2012) (describing two analogous
enforcement actions); Paul Moura, Harmless Tweets or Deceptive Speech? The Problem of
Stealth Marketing in New Media, the Dual Regulatory Roles of the F .TC., and the Market
for Social Capital, 33 WHITTIER L. REV. 613, 614, 630-33, 638-50 (2012) (identifying
potential First Amendment concerns with such deceptive speech disclosure requirements,
and arguing that the FTC should tread lightly).
132. See Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1771, 1793-95 (2012); see also Gonenq Girkaynak et al., Antitrust on the Internet: a
Comparative Assessment of Competition Law Enforcement in the Internet Realm, 14 Bus.
L. INT'L 51, 59-60 (2013) (discussing analysis of social networking mergers by DOJ and
the FTC).
133. Id. at 1794. See also id. at 1795 ("At least one consumer group has filed
complaints with the FTC alleging that Facebook has entered into exclusionary contracts
with game developers. Facebook and Google have traded allegations relating to the
ability to obtain (or block) information from each other's site, a practice called
'scraping."').
134. See Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1581-82 (2012).
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practice."' The FTC and the White House hope to make platform
companies commit to tight, industry-wide codes of conduct so that the
FTC can, with the force of law, regulate compliance with such
codes."' The federal government hopes that platform providers will
submit to legally enforceable commitments to censor themselves
(and, collaterally, their users) thereby eluding the First Amendment.
There are costs to regulating platforms in this manner.
Regulation through competition enforcement and consumer
protection agencies necessarily warps and narrows the speech values
the government promotes and restricts.137 Indirect and evasive
mechanisms, such as coerced privacy policies and impossible-to-
satisfy mandatory disclosure requirements enhance the potential for
abuses of discretion. It also serves to mask the important First
Amendment issues at stake in these decisions."' Yet, scholars and
privacy advocates are beginning to call for investing in these agencies
even more permeating and capacious authority.139
3. The Perils of Fiction and Discretion: The Example of Wikileaks
Investing the government's powers to regulate speech on
platforms in broad grants of discretionary authority creates significant
risks. The dangers were revealed in the government's efforts to
punish and censor Wikileaks for disclosing government secrets.
While no new laws were passed, and no laws facially implicating the
First Amendment were ultimately enforced, Wikileaks' access to
135. See Francoise Gilbert, FTC v. Google: A Blueprint for Your Next Privacy Audit,
16 J. INTERNET L. 1, 15-17 (2012); see also Brill, supra note 131, at 1298 ("We believed
that, contrary to Google's representations, Google provided Gmail users with ineffective
options for declining or leaving the social network."). Ms. Brill is an FTC Commissioner.
136. See Thomas Hemnes, The Ownership and Exploitation of Personal Identity in the
New Media Age, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 30 (2012).
137. It is perhaps ironic that the one kind of subtle manipulation and censorship from
which consumers are shielded is commercial manipulation. See Moura, supra note 131, at
622 (noting that "the FTC has indicated that its enforcement of Section 5 only targets
[commercial speech]"); see also Matthew Sundquist, Online Privacy Protection: Protecting
Privacy, the Social Contract, and the Rule of Law in the Virtual World, 25 REGENT U. L.
REV. 153, 173-75 (2013) (characterizing privacy enforcement as the overriding concern in
the federal regulation of online platforms).
138. Cf MOROZOV, supra note 39, at 89 ("Officials in some Gulf states are calling for
the creation of blogging associations, while one of Russia's top bureaucrats recently
proposed to set up a 'Bloggers' Chamber' that can set standards of acceptable behavior in
the blogosphere, so that the Kremlin does not have to resort to formal censorship.").
139. See, e.g., G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service, and FTC Enforcement:
Broadening Unfairness Regulation for A New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REV. 163, 197-200 (2012).
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hosting, domain name servers, bandwidth, and funds were restricted,
disrupted, and even completely cut off as a result of government
pressure on third-party companies.'" The Wikileaks episode reveals
that "[c]ommercial owners of the critical infrastructures of the
networked environment can deny service to controversial speakers,"
and the government "can use this vulnerability to bring to bear new
kinds of pressure" that were once less salient, less available, and less
141
easily effectuated before the Internet's rise.
Apart from the Wikileaks episode, private companies have also
voluntarily complied with U.S. Treasury Department export controls
and other requests by Executive Branch actors to engage in literal
and tacit censorship. The web hosting company BlueHost, for
example, cut off access to over 300 million potential customers in
what it characterized as "sanctioned" jurisdictions in 2009,142 while the
social network LinkedIn suspended all accounts originating in Syria. 143
Though there is "no evidence" that the U.S. Government demanded
such censorship, the costs of uncertainty and a tacit fear of
government discretion seemed to motivate these actions.144
III. An Internet Without Law
The technological, social, and legal consequences attending these
changes on the rights of individuals and the constitutional values of
freedom, dignity, and individual self-determination are difficult to
overstate. It is important to see that at war are two conceptions of
"speech"-one that places the rights of individuals at the apex, and
one that places the rights of institutions at the apex. These
conceptions are in a desperate struggle.
A. The Erosion of Independence
Individuals, groups, companies, and nations are touched by the
power of platforms to dictate the terms of the digital landscape. The
company that depends entirely for its economic fate on a position in a
140. See Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment Is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2012); Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the
Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 311,
330-31, 365-67 (2011).
141. Benkler, supra note 140, at 311.
142. See Ethan Zuckerman, Intermediary Censorship, in ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE
SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULES IN CYBERSPACE 71, 74-78 (Ronald J. Deibert
et al. eds., 2010).
143. Id. at 77-78.
144. Id. at 74-80.
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Google search ranking or access to Twitter's data stream are subject
to the whims of powerful private interests in a way that greatly
influences both what is said, and how it is said. 45
But, more than commercial interests are at stake. These
platforms' choices have the power to shape our cultural
conversation-the speech and association rights of individuals-in
ways that are both subtle and overt. As the Occupy Wall Street
protests caught fire, attracting support, enthusiasm, outrage,
controversy, and intense media scrutiny, the #occupywallstreet hash-
tag nonetheless failed to achieve the status of a Twitter Trend.146 The
Twitter algorithm, with its emphasis on new news, discovery,
disruption, and cross-cluster penetration47  was presumably
unconcerned with the expressive implications that granting or
withholding #occupywallstreet the special status of a trend entailed.
Twitter's algorithm implements a set of values for Twitter that impact
society, but it is unclear whether Twitter ever carefully considered
this impact.'48
An unreflective reliance on search and sorting algorithms-
about which most people know almost nothing about-can subtly
influence our dispositions and attitudes.149 In the run-up to the 2012
presidential election, Google results tended to return positive articles
about Barack Obama and negative articles about Mitt Romney.'
Search engines tend to privilege their own services when returning
145. For companies that depended on their position in Google's search rankings, see,
for example, Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007); and
Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4
(W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). For an example of a company dependent on Twitter's data,
see J. Alexander Lawrence & Amanda Bakale, PeopleBrowsr Wins Round One Against
Twitter, SOCIALLYAWARE (Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.sociallyawareblog.com/2012/12/05/
peoplebrowsr-wins-round-one-against-twitter ("The Superior Court of the State of
California has entered a temporary restraining order requiring Twitter to continue to
provide PeopleBrowsr with access to the Firehose, Twitter's complete stream of all public
tweets. Through the Firehose, Twitter provides third-party access to over 400 million
daily tweets.").
146. See Tarleton Gillespie, Can an Algorithm Be Wrong?, LIMN (Mar. 27, 2012),
http://limn.it/can-analgorithm-be-wrong.
147. See id. (describing how the Twitter algorithm decides what is trending).
148. See id.
149. See Eric K. Clemons & Steve Barnett, Quick: Is Someone Trying to Steal Your
Agora?, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-k-
clemons/quick-is-someone-trying-t_b_800536.html; Eric K. Clemons & Josh Wilson, Can
Google Influence an Election?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/eric-k-clemons/google-election-2012 b_1952725.html.
150. See Rob Enderle, The United States of Google, TECHNEWSWORLD (Oct. 1,
2012), http://www.technewsworld.com/story/The-United-States-of-Google-76273.html.
search results, with Google among the most likely to favor its own.''
Ranking algorithms, like the online mediascape itself, are acutely
susceptible to manipulation.'52 Many "memes"-discrete units of
culture that spread quickly across the Internet'53 -are constructed:15 4
"made, not born."' Because memes are identifiable, Google,
YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook are in an arms race to tailor their
algorithms to find and promote the most infectious memes.'
Additionally, memes grab attention, bring satisfaction, and foster
platform loyalty.' What memes do not do is reflect the full spectrum
of human experience, nor, often, cultural and political discussion of a
particularly nuanced, deep, or reflective kind.
151. See BENJAMIN EDELMAN & BENJAMIN LOCKWOOD, MEASURING BIAS IN
"ORGANIC" WEB SEARCH (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias; Amir
Efrati, Rivals Say Google Plays Favorites, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2010), http://online.wsj.
com/article/SB10001424052748704058704576015630188568972.html; David Segal, A Bully
Finds a Pulpit on the Web, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/
28/business/28borker.html?pagewanted=all.
152. See RYAN HOLIDAY, TRUST ME I'M LYING: CONFESSIONS OF A MEDIA
MANIPULATOR 19-21 (2012).
153. For a tongue-in-cheek collection of definitions, see Meme, URBAN DICTIONARY,
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=meme (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
154. HOLIDAY, supra note 152, at 15-16. This is a theme throughout the book.
155. MOROZOV, supra note 29, at 156. I found many of the academic articles in
footnotes 156-58 through the efforts of Evgeny Morozov to whom I owe a debt of
gratitude. See id. at 156-63 and sources cited therein.
156. See, e.g., B.J. MENDELSON, SOCIAL MEDIA IS BULLSHIT 46 (2012) (describing
operation of the YouTube algorithm); Taina Bucher, A Technicity of Attention: How
Software 'Makes Sense', 13 CULTURE MACHINE 1, 6-11 (2012), available at
http://culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/470; Taina Bucher, The
Friendship Assemblage: Investigating Programmed Sociality on Facebook, 7 TELEVISION
& NEW MEDIA 1, 2-3, 7-8, 9-10 (2012), available at http://tvn.sagepub.com/content/
early/2012/08/14/1527476412452800.abstract (describing how one of the essential ways in
which Facebook connects people and ensures user satisfaction is by limiting exposure to
difference); Taina Bucher, Want To Be On Top? Algorithmic Power and the Threat of
Invisibility on Facebook, 14 NEW MEDIA & Soc'Y 1164, 1174-78 (2012), available at
http://nms.sagepub.com/content/14/7/1164 (describing and critiquing how Facebook's
ranking algorithm selects stories).
157. See HOLIDAY, supra note 152, at 51-52 ("The web has only one currency, and
you can use any word you want for it-valence, extremes, arousal, powerfulness,
excitement-but it adds up to false perception."); Id. at 82-84 (describing a rule that
"[f]orty percent of every article must be cut," and citing studies showing that blog posts
ordinarily range in length from 200 to 500 words); C.W. Anderson, Deliberative, Agonistic,
and Algorithmic Audiences: Journalism's Vision of Its Public in an Age of Audience
Transparency, 5 INT'L J. COMM. 529, 541-43 (2011).
158. See HOLIDAY, supra note 152, at 49 (quoting Jonah Peretti, "the virality expert
behind both the Huffington Post and BuzzFeed"; "'[I]f something is a total bummer,
people don't share it.' And since people wouldn't share it, blogs won't publish it.").
Google and Facebook's algorithms will endeavor to bury it too.
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Speech values and self-determination are also influenced by
exclusion and deletion. Accidental censorship is inevitable in a world
mediated by algorithms."9 But, it is not random. What often falls
into the zone of error is speech that we have spent nearly a century
struggling to protect. Speech that tests boundaries, challenges
existing notions, and subverts expectations is most likely to be what
the algorithms target. They label such speech lewd, indecent,
pornographic, harassing, bullying or hateful-categories of content-
discrimination the federal government protects from suit in 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2).'6 Google expelled Guernica, a literary magazine, from
the AdSense program because Guernica ran a short story by Clancy
Martin entitled Early Sexual Experiences.161 Martin is not prone to
lewd and indecent speech. His work typically appears in the likes of
Harper's, McSweeney's, The London Review of Books, and the New
York Times.162 Google's algorithm, nonetheless, labeled Early Sexual
Experiences as pornography."
There are other examples. Sahara Reporters is a website that
coordinates the efforts of dozens of Nigerian citizen journalists. In
response to a particularly shocking instance of police brutality, the
editors chose to run the extremely graphic photos that resulted."
Google's algorithms found them too violent and it suspended Sahara
Reporters from AdSense.6 1
Facebook's content-censoring algorithms are similarly
unforgiving. Facebook's algorithm will promptly delete Gustave
Courbet's 150-year-old painting L'Origine du monde (The Origin of
the World) if one tries to post it-and such louts run the added risk of
159. Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Internet Filtering: The Politics and Mechanisms
of Control, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET
FILTERING 29, 46 (Ronald J. Deibert et al. eds., 2008) ("Internet filtering is almost
impossible to accomplish with any degree of precision.").
160. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012).
161. See MOROzOv, supra note 29, at 140-41.
162. See Clancy Martin, Early Sexual Experiences: A Writer Recollects, GUERNICA
(Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.guernicamag.com/features/martin_2_15_11; see also Macy
Halford, Weekly Reader, THE NEW YORKER: PAGE-TURNER (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/books/2011/02/weekly-reader.html ("I chanced on
Clancy Martin's account of his early sexual experiences in Guernica's new issue, which was
graphic and disturbing (perhaps this was the intention).").
163. See MOROZOV, supra note 29, at 141.
164. See id.
165. See id.
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having their accounts suspended even for trying.166  Photos of
women's body-painted breasts displayed in support of a Breast
Cancer Awareness Project were labeled pornographic and
automatically deleted.1' Facebook removed a gay kiss.'" Facebook
disabled the account of a woman who posted photos of her friend
holding her newborn child shortly after birth,'6 ' and it censored a
photo of a large nude statue on public display at the Burning Man
festival."o Facebook's efforts have had a profound distortive effect.
At least one art museum has chosen to censor its own photo
exhibition-a Robert Mapplethorpe retrospective"'-to avoid the
wrath of Facebook's algorithm.
While Facebook's algorithms label art as pornography, they also
label provocative political speech as harassing, bullying, irrelevant or
nonproductive; Facebook removes that as well. According to a 2011
report by the John Milton Project for Religious Free Speech, nearly
all major platform companies-from Google to Facebook-"have
'actively' censored Christian and conservative viewpoints."' 3 In the
anxious final weeks of the 2012 presidential election, Facebook took
166. See G. Roger Denson, Courbet's Origin Of The World Still Too Scandalous For
Media-Savvy Facebook!, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/g-roger-denson/courbets-1866-the-origin-_b_1087604.html.
167. Breast Cancer Body Paintings Called Pornographic By Facebook, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/03/breast-cancer-body-painti
n_1074725.html.
168. Lee, supra note 39.
169. Ryan J. Foley, Facebook Apologizes For Censoring Birth Photographer Laura
Eckert, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/07/
facebook-apologizes-birth-photographern_805823.html.
170. Elinor Mills, Oops! Facebook mistakenly censors Burning Man art, CNET (Sept.
15, 2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080 3-20016543-245.html?part=rss&subj=news&
tag=2547-1_3-0-20.
171. Mapplethorpe's work has long posed a challenge to the First Amendment. The
NEA's funding for a retrospective of his work caused Congress to revise the NEA's grant
criteria, which ultimately gave rise to Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,
603-04 (1998).
172. Swedish Photography Museum Censors Photos To Avoid Facebook Conflict,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/15/swedish-
photography-museun_965358.html.
173. See Jeremy Kryn, Facebook, Google, Social Media Sites 'Actively' Censor
Christian Content: Study, LIFESITENEWS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.lifesitenews.com/
news/facebook-google-social-media-sites-actively-censor-christian-content-study. The
referenced study is: CRAIG L. PARSHALL, ET. AL., TRUE LIBERTY IN A NEW MEDIA AGE:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE THREAT OF ANTI-CHRISTIAN CENSORSHIP AND OTHER
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION ON NEW MEDIA PLATFORMS (2011), available at http://
content.nrb.org/Webdocs/Legalf/rue%201iberty-in-a-New-Media-Age9-15-11.pdf.
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down a "popular piece of political propaganda" showing Barack
Obama alongside Osama Bin Laden. 17 4 The message was "partisan,
simplistic, and arguably misleading," but as media accounts of the
incident hastened to note, "that's true of most political memes.""'
Even though the meme went viral every time it was posted, Facebook
not only deleted it thrice, but it froze the originating account for
twenty-four hours, preventing the group from posting anything at
all.176 Facebook threatened to shut down the Facebook page "Chicks
on the Right" for posting a message critical of Jay Carney, the White
House Press Secretary."' Facebook also threatened to ban the
associated personal account."' Conservative political activist Diane
Sori's account has been frozen at least six times for failing to speedily
delete posts and failing to block users whose posts violate Facebook's
terms of service on the Sarah Palin Facebook fan page, which Sori
administers.179 Feeling unfairly targeted on Facebook, the Tea Party
is now launching its own right-wing social network alternative to
Facebook called "Tea Party Community,"',o which already boasts





177. Jason Howerton, Facebook Apologizes for Threatening to Shut Down
Conservative Fan Page Over Post Critical of Obama Admin., THE BLAZE (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/01/23/facebook-apologizes-for-threatening-to-shut-
down-conservative-fan-page-over-post-critical-of-obama-admin. The post linked to a
third-party blog post entitled "You Know What? Liberal Hypocrisy is Starting to Cause Me
Actual Physical Pain," and concluded with the message "Jay Carney can kiss my assular
area." Id.
178. Mockarena, Forward This to Everyone You Know. Facebook Is Trying to Shut
Us Down, CHICKS ON THE RIGHT: BECAUSE CONSERVATISM NEEDS A MAKEOVER (Jan.
22, 2013), http://chicksontheright.com/categories/the-makeover-and-or-miscellaneouslitem
/23715-forward-this-to-everyone-you-know-facebook-is-trying-to-shut-us-down#pagejump.
Amy Jo Clark and Miriam Weaver run the Chicks On the Right website under the
pseudonyms Daisy and Mockarena. See Todd Starnes, Conservatives Launch Facebook
Alternative, Fox NEWS (Jan. 31, 2013), http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstarnes/top-stories/
conservatives-launch-facebook-alternative.html.
179. Liz Klimas, Conservatives Continue to Accuse Facebook of Unfairly Blocking
Them-Three New Cases Reported, THE BLAZE (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.theblaze.com/
stories/2013/03/27/conservatives-continue-to-accuse-facebook-of-unfairly-blocking-them-
three-new-cases-reported. The Group is "Barracuda Brigade for Our American Girl!
2012." Id.
180. See Jason Howerton, Conservatives Launch New Social Network to Escape
Facebook 'Censorship'-Will You Join?, THE BLAZE (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.theblaze.
com/stories/2013/01/31/conservatives-launch-new-social-network-to-escape-facebook-
censorship.
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over 50,000 profiles."' The Tea Party Community's homepage
identifies itself as a "safe haven" for conservative political speech.182
American conservatives are not the only group Facebook's
algorithms silence. The author of A Queer Thing Happened to
America saw the Facebook page promoting his book speedily
removed.'83 Facebook also deleted an Arabic-language Facebook
group with over 350,000 members that had called for a third intifada
against Israel. 4 Chinese dissidents and politically unpopular social
movements in authoritarian nations are the most frequently censored
groups of all.'
Digital speech intermediaries possess and exercise a new kind of
control over the speech of individuals, associations, groups, and
communities. It is sometimes the product of human decisions to
exclude and censor from the common spaces that have become the
forums for communication on the Internet. But more important than
these human-driven interventions are the interventions of algorithms.
Algorithms possess a power human censors never had. They have the
capacity to engage in person-by-person and conversation-by-
conversation regulation of the interactions between individuals and
their online communities. Even though the decisions algorithms
make often have enormous impacts on the lives of real people, they
also often filter and distort in a way their programmers could never
181. See id.
182. See TEA PARTY COMMUNITY, https://www.teapartycommunity.com (last visited
Nov. 19, 2013); see also Starnes, supra note 178 (describing the Tea Party Social Network
and quoting Miriam Weaver, "Conservatives are desperate right now to find an outlet
where they can speak freely and not worry about liberal trolls and censorship").
According to the article, "liberal 'trolls' are taking advantage of a Facebook algorithm that
focuses on pages with controversial content" to silence conservative ideas they disagree
with. Id.
183. See Michael Brown, The Facebook Censor Strikes, TOWN HALL (June 13, 2012),
http://townhall.com/columnists/michaelbrown/2012/06/13/the-facebookcensor-strikes/pag
e/full.
184. See Meredith Jessup, Facebook Shuts Down 'Third Intifada' Group, THE BLAZE
(Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.theblaze.com/blog/2011/03/29/facebook-shuts-down-third-
intifada-group ("While I oppose 'censorship,' I'm glad that Facebook has some standards
of human decency."); see also Alex Margolin, Facebook Refuses to Remove Group Calling
for Third Intifada, BACKSPIN (Mar. 29, 2011), http://honestreporting.com/facebook-
refuses-to-remove-group-calling-for-third-intifadal (noting that Facebook shut down the
group an hour after the article posted).
185. See MOROZOV, supra note 39, at 101-05 (describing how authoritarian regimes
outsource censorship to companies like Facebook and Google). See also id. at 214 ("[A]
2009 study found that Microsoft has been censoring what users in the United Arab
Emirates, Syria, Algeria, and Jordan could find through its Bing search engine much more
heavily than the governments of those countries.").
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have foreseen and did not intend. To grant these platforms and their
algorithms insulation from legal regulation under the guise of
protecting the "freedom of speech" set forth in the First Amendment
stands to mean that there will be no necessary nexus-as there is in
the physical world-between public values and the ability to speak
and be heard." Decisions about who may speak, who may
participate, and who must stand silent will be more than merely
privatized; they will be delegated to machines.
B. From Government Power to Private Power
There is no question that algorithms will play an increasingly
important and sophisticated role in how individuals interact with one
another. Rather, the question is whether the ways in which those
algorithms are structured, the values they implement, and the ways
they make decisions, will ultimately reside solely in the hands of
private interests or if those decisions will be something that laws will
have the capacity to shape.
Without government, it is almost certain that the ways in which
people interact with one another will be guided by values orthogonal
to those that have ordinarily been thought central to the First
Amendment. Speech that might brook disagreement or start an
argument-speech that might provoke, anger, or cut deep-is
unlikely to be shared or promoted." Even if it is shared and debated,
perhaps out of vitriol alone, it might prompt some to leave the
platform, or change the atmosphere of the conversations that occur.
This may reduce the amount of uplifting and optimistic speech
individuals engage in as they are drawn into debates about difficult
partisan questions. If left purely to the market, platform providers
will not tolerate speech that damages their commercial interests in
this way.
These circumstances would seem to call for tough choices about
what our society values. There is a challenging balance that must be
186. In the physical world, the First Amendment is shaped by a myriad of public
values that are difficult, if not impossible, to replicate online. Public forums, such as
schools, churches, and community centers are more easily built and made useful than a
"local" community social network ever could be. Distributing a newspaper to the
members of one's community was as easy as printing and distributing it on the sidewalk,
on porches, or in the park. But, in an era of Amazon Prime-when fewer and fewer ever
venture forth into the "physical" public square to speak and be heard-it will be only
through digital intermediaries that these messages get out. When that is so, it is worth
considering whether these private intermediaries can be told to shoulder public
responsibilities.
187. See HOLIDAY, supra note 152, at 49.
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struck between competing irreconcilable interests. On the one hand,
there is valuable speech that relates to community, shared values, and
family; on the other hand, there is political speech that arouses
rancor, dissention, and unorthodox views. We, as a polity, stand on
the verge of tough questions about how to balance these interests in a
meaningful way. We might think, in other words, that our society will
soon confront a political question about how to strike an appropriate
balance between individuals' interests in speaking freely and
platforms' interests in censoring and organizing their users' speech
commercially.
But, if the doctrines in the courts hold sway, there will not be a
question to answer. There will be no balancing because the First
Amendment will have already decided the question. Platforms'
content-discrimination will be fully protected by the First
Amendment. This is the vision ascendant in the federal courts. If no
change is made, it will only harden further into amber in the years to
come.
The case of Karen Beth Young illustrates how conventional First
Amendment doctrine ignores the power of private platforms to
profoundly shape the speech and autonomy of individuals.'" Karen
Beth has bipolar disorder,"' causing her to behave in unconventional
ways and saddling her with unconventional needs.'" But, on
Facebook, she found an unprecedented opportunity to connect with
others. 91 On Facebook, Karen Beth started "some very sincere
relationships ... [ailbeit online, they were genuine and heartfelt."'9
She soon had 5,000 Facebook friends, and Facebook required that she
convert her account to that of a "Public Figure."' 93 Dismayed by this
because it would require her to expose much private information to
the entire world, rather than her 5,000 friends (whom Karen Beth
188. For an excellent discussion, see Kashmir Hill, Maryland Woman Sues After Being
Banned by Facebook, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2010/09/01/maryland-woman-sues-after-being-banned-by-facebook (calling the Facebook
"justice system" "Kafkaesque").
189. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages at 2, Young v.
Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 5:10-cv-03579-JF/PVT).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2,4, 5.
192. Id. at 9.
193. Id.
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considered "real friends"" 4), she started a Facebook petition to
remove the 5,000 friend cap for private accounts.
Facebook disabled her account and all the pages she
administered, which affected the speech interests of thousands who
regularly interacted through pages set up by Karen Beth.'6 In her
efforts to restore her account, Karen Beth used Facebook's
automated systems, sent numerous emails, called the Facebook
offices, and eventually drove from her home on the east coast to
Facebook's headquarters in the Silicon Valley where she met a
receptionist who would not identify herself." Finally, Karen Beth
sued Facebook pro se.
In Young v. Facebook, Inc., Karen Beth's lawsuit against
Facebook included claims for deprivations of her First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights and a failure on the part of Facebook
to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (which requires
places of public accommodation to account for the needs of those
with special needs).'98 The District Court for the Northern District of
California dismissed her First Amendment claim because Facebook is
not a state actor," and her Americans with Disabilities Act claims
because Facebook is not a place of public accommodation."
At no point did the court in Young grapple with the speech
interests at stake in the case. Resolving the question on the grounds
that Facebook simply owed Karen Beth no duty at all, the court
believed that whatever speech interests she and the thousands of
others who lost access to her pages possessed were so minimal they
did not warrant careful examination. But, even if the court had held
that she could bring suit against Facebook, 47 U.S.C. § 230 would
have shielded Facebook from liability.20' And, even if the court had
navigated past the state action issues, the immunity statute, and the
Facebook Terms of Service Karen Beth signed, it still may have held
194. Id.
195. Id (The petition was entitled "Join Karen, petition Facebook Say No To 5000 Friends.").
196. Id. at 10.
197. Id. at 8.
198. See Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1113 (N.D. Cal. 2011). See
also Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-03579-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 4269304, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 25, 2010).
199. Young, 2010 WL 4269304, at *2.
200. Young, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
201. See Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465,472 (3d Cir. 2003).
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that Facebook had the right to engage in editorial decisions of its
choosing because such decisions are Facebook's speech.'
Young is important for it reveals a seismic distortion in the
values underlying the First Amendment.203 In a society that purports
to hold individual autonomy and the right to speak and be heard at
the apex of First Amendment values, there are now at least four
levels of immunity for content-based censorship: (1) terms of service
agreements that all users must sign waiving the ability to bring claims
of unfair termination, censorship or exclusion; (2) the federal laws
that immunize platforms from liability for content-discrimination; (3)
that platforms are not recognized as state actors or places of public
accommodation and thereby owe no duties to those who use them;
and (4) the First Amendment itself, which courts are increasingly
interpreting to mean that all decisions about what happens on an
online platform constitute the speech of the platform and are
therefore beyond the reach of law. All the forces of positive law now
array themselves against the vindication of that most elemental of all
First Amendment claims-that one has been unjustly silenced. More
astoundingly, that silencing may not even have been the product of a
deliberate human decision, but a software glitch. Algorithmic speech
now possesses, it seems, greater constitutional protection than human
speech.
C. The Courts' Cyber Utopianism
The reasons that the courts muscularly protect the speech of
Internet platforms vary, but there has been, up to now, an underlying
vision that unites them. This vision is the union of two powerful
strands of First Amendment thought. The first, and less significant
strand, is a general suspicion of all government intervention.2 0 But
the second, and much more powerful strand, has been the courts'
belief that the Internet is a fundamentally unintermediated
202. See sources cited supra note 14.
203. Compare Young, 2010 WL 4269304, and Green, 318 F.3d at 472, with Associated
Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945) (holding that it "degrade[s]" the First
Amendment to use it as a shield for business practices that restrict the "dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources").
204. For a prominent recent case in which this was the Court's overriding concern, see
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 911 (2010). See also Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REv. 143, 146, 155 (2010)
(describing how even the most permissive judges find speech suspect when drawn along
"suspect lines," and the least permissive find all government attempts to regulate speech
highly suspect).
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medium205-providing for the first time ever a million soapboxes on a
million tiny streetcorners.20' This vision undergirds perhaps the most
important judicial decision concerning Internet speech, the case of
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union.207
Congress passed the Communications Decency Act of 1996
("CDA") to protect children from the evils of online pornography
and sexual victimization. 2' As incoherent as it was unconstitutional, 209
the Act sought to prohibit the knowing transmission of obscene or
indecent messages to any recipient under 18 years of age,210 and the
knowing sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a
manner that was available to a person under 18 years of age.21' Vague
and overbroad, the CDA was rapidly struck down by two different
three-judge panels.212
In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice John Paul Stevens,
the Supreme Court also struck down the CDA.21' Given the Court's
decision, it is hard to say precisely what prompted Justice Stevens to
write so lengthy an opinion. One subsection is titled simply "The
Internet" and eleven separately numbered sections canvas every
conceivable argument.214 Perhaps it was because the case was the
Court's first opportunity to comprehensively address freedom of
speech on the Internet,215 or perhaps it was precisely because the case
was easy. Whatever the reasons, however, Reno v. American Civil
205. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 701-04.
206. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of
Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1670 (1998); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and
What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1834 (1995); Note, The Message in the Medium: The
First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1082-83
(1994).
207. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
208. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1574, 1581 (1999); Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering,
38 JURIMETRICS J. 629, 630-31 (1998).
209. See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 189 (1997) (calling it "badly drafted,
inconsistently worded, and palpably unconstitutional").
210. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1994 ed., Supp. II).
211. Id. at § 223(d).
212. See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Am. Civil Liberties
Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
213. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
214. See id. at 849-85.
215. See Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-from Sidewalks to Cyberspace,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1610-11 (1998).
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Liberties Union provided Justice Stevens an extraordinary
opportunity to rhapsodize on liberty.
And, Rhapsodize he did. "Anyone with access to the Internet,"
he wrote, can take advantage of "electronic mail (e-mail), automatic
mailing list services,... 'newsgroups,' 'chat rooms,' and the 'World
Wide Web.""" This place and all of its benefits are "available to
anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet." 217 For
users, the Internet is comparable to both "a vast library including
millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling
mall offering goods and services." 218
In Justice Stevens' view, more important than the benefits the
Internet offered users was what it offered publishers:
From the publishers' point of view, it constitutes a
vast platform from which to address and hear from a
worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers,
researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization
with a computer connected to the Internet can
"publish" information. Publishers include government
agencies, educational institutions, commercial entities,
advocacy groups, and individuals. Publishers may
either make their material available to the entire pool
of Internet users, or confine access to a selected group,
such as those willing to pay for the privilege. "No
single organization controls any membership in the
Web, nor is there any single centralized point from
which individual Web sites or services can be blocked
from the Web." 219
And, later in the opinion:
[T]he Internet can hardly be considered a "scarce"
expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited,
low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds....
This dynamic, multifaceted category of
communication includes not only traditional print and
news services, but also audio, video, and still images,
216. Reno, 521 U.S. at 851.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 853.
219. Id.
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as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the
use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of
Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same
individual can become a pamphleteer. As the District
Court found, "the content on the Internet is as diverse
as human thought."2 20
Justice Stevens' vision of the Internet was as a stateless
libertarian utopia, limitless in possibility, vast in scope, destined to
vindicate the First Amendment's highest aims. The Internet would
be an unregulated marketplace of ideas and the ultimate
demonstration of the power of that marketplace.
The implications of Reno v. ACLU could hardly be weightier, for
it embossed a potent image that still exerts considerable force even as
it drifts further and further from reality.22' Reno v. ACLU imported
into First Amendment thought the notion that the Internet can suffer
no scarcity, abide no censorship, and offer everyone an audience.
The Internet would be a Speech Utopia. But, just as utopia literally
means "no place," the courts read Reno v. ACLU to mean that the
First Amendment demands "no law."
This play has been staged before and we are entering its second
act. The protection of data, editorial control, and platform rights in
the name of liberty mirrors the rigid protection for liberty of contract
Lochner once enshrined.222 The question of what it means to have the
"freedom" of speech has drifted from a freedom centered on
individual liberty to a freedom centered on powerful institutions,
implemented as a blanket prohibition on government action. This is
backward, not because it enhances the power of a few speakers at the
expense of the many, but because it means that our discourse stands
220. Id. at 870.
221. See WU, supra note 18 (discussing the way in which new media platforms
eventually come to be controlled by powerful centralized interests).
222. Cf. J. M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 400-01 (1990) (arguing that a Lochner-ian vision
of the First Amendment would hold that lacking the resources to speak constitutes no
First Amendment harm); cf also Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:
A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 27-
28 (2004) (making the slightly different point that powerful corporate interests are
attempting to coopt the meaning of liberty to protect corporate and commercial speech
interests in the modern information society).
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to be manipulated and controlled in ways society cannot reflect upon
nor shape. The First Amendment values speech to the limits of
human thought, but Facebook and Google value speech to the limits
of its commercial value.
What is at stake, then, is the very idea that government
intervention can protect the freedom of speech and even enhance that
freedom. The closed, platformed, and unregulable Internet remains
perhaps only a glimmer on the horizon, but it poses difficult questions
that society should probably have a hand in answering: What happens
to dissent, tolerance, and civic engagement when speech is routed,
controlled, and suppressed invisibly and instantaneously?223 How will
our notions of justice, fairness, and equality be shaped when the
marketplace of attention-rather than the marketplace of
persuasion-becomes the primary exchange upon which ideas trade?
What will become of society if individuals have the sense that they
cannot speak freely for fear that some intermediary will quietly
sensor their thoughts?
IV. The Place of Speech in Society: An Old Debate Revisited
The vision of speech that now prevails-as absolutely protected
from the action of the state-represents the end of a great and
necessary movement. It represents victory for the notion that the
ideas that matter cannot be selected in advance. And, it signifies an
enormous respect for conscience and autonomy. But, it is a bludgeon.
The notion that the government has no role to play has served us
well, but in the age of digital intermediaries with enormous capacity
to control and shape our cultural conversation, the consequences of
withdrawing government entirely defeat the very ends non-
interference was meant to protect. It might, therefore, be profitable
to revisit the origins of the institution of speech itself and, in doing so,
perhaps briefly rearticulate its purposes.
A. Speech and Liberty
Speech is more an institution than an action. The freedom of
speech preserves the right to speak, but only incidentally and not
even primarily.224 Fraud, conspiracy, and treason are ordinarily best
223. See MOROZOV, supra note 39, at 197-203.
224. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons
from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 273, 274-76 (2009).
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accomplished in words, but we infrequently shield them.225 Paintings,
seldom inscribed in words, are at the freedom's core.26
Speech, as an institution, serves many functions. One of these is
to protect conscience from coercion. 227 This can be accomplished, as
for centuries it has been, by building a wall between the individual
and the state. Within the citadel, on the rostrum, the speaker cannot
be touched. He cannot be silenced. He must be free to say his piece,
take his stand, bring to light his facts, make his case. He, the lone
dissenter, is our culture's paragon. 22 We array all our institutions so
as to let him speak and, in doing so, we vindicate our highest aims. It
is the essence of esteem for deliberation, respect for conscience, and
the ultimate admission of our belief in our own capacity for error.
Off the rostrum, the dissenter must respect the laws, but while on it,
he may urge us all to break them.229
These beliefs are rooted in a history. They begin more than half
a millennium ago with the rise of printing. 2 Before the invention of
the printing press, speech had no particular salience as an
untouchable component of cultural and political life.231 Much as any
other conduct, it could be deterred or it could be punished, but it was
of modest importance. Without the ability to reach a mass audience,
speech was not conceptually or practically important. 2
There was a sudden change with the invention of the press.
Moveable type destabilized existing hierarchies.233 Individuals for the
first time could share information and beliefs widely and
permanently. The state, still attached to old values and old frames,
sought control. 234  The creation of the printing press enhanced the
power of the individual to influence the affairs of the state and of
225. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992).
226. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995).
227. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
228. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408-
13 (1986).
229. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,448-49 (1969).
230. See M. Ethan Katsh, The First Amendment and Technological Change: The New
Media Have A Message, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1462-66 (1989).
231. See Robert Corn-Revere, New Technology and the First Amendment: Breaking
the Cycle of Repression, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 264 (1994).
232. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 14-15 (1983); see M.
ETHAN KATSH, THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 136 (1989).
233. See M. Ethan Katsh, Communications Revolutions and Legal Revolutions: The
New Media and the Future of Law, 8 NOVA L. REV. 631, 646-55 (1984).
234. See KATSH, supra note 232, at 137-38.
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society, and in doing so, brought for the first time into profound
conflict individual conscience, private power, and government
authority.235
The idea embedded in freedom of speech-the very reasons for
it, and our notions of it-are ineluctably wrapped in the most
important disruption that followed from this fateful invention: the
Reformation.236 It was a Bible Gutenberg printed.237 At a time when
faith permeated every facet of individual and communal life, the
notion that one might hold the words of God-and thereby know
them-possessed unimaginable power. But, to obtain them
required the means of mass reproduction and mass communication.239
Martin Luther's theses could never have spread to every corner of the
world without the technology of the press.2
Technologies possess a reflexive quality. As we shape them, so
they shape us. The notion that one could obtain the words of God
introduced into Western thought the then revolutionary idea that one
was entitled to interpret them241-to know them for oneself.2 42 This
idea soon gave rise to another, even more revolutionary idea that
would shape the renaissance, spark the enlightenment, and change
the world.243 Not only was it allowable to look at the text, Protestants
235. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine:
Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34
IND. L. REV. 295, 298 (2001).
236. See Ronald K.L. Collins, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 532-33 (1992); Thomas
F. Cotter, Gutenberg's Legacy: Copyright, Censorship, and Religious Pluralism, 91 CALIF.
L. REV. 323, 324-27 & nn.1-5. (2003); Katsh, supra, note 230, at 1468 n.41.
237. See JAMES THORPE, THE GUTENBERG BIBLE: LANDMARK IN LEARNING 26 (2d
ed. 1999)
238. See ROBERT BROWN, THE SPIRIT OF PROTESTANTISM 67-68 (1965); A.G.
DICKENS, THE ENGLISH REFORMATION 189-93 (1971); Louis BOUYER, LITURGICAL
PIETY 253-54 (1955).
239. See A.G. DICKENS, REFORMATION AND SOCIETY IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY
EUROPE 51 (1966).
240. See ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING PRESS AS AN AGENT OF
CHANGE 303-07 (1979).
241. Rather than their adherence to the faith, the Anglican Book of Common Prayer
asked only that priests resolve to teach the doctrine that he was "persuaded may be
concluded, and proved by the scripture." FIRST BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER OF
EDWARD VI, Ordinal 494 (1869) (1st ed. London 1549).
242. See MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY: THE MAKING OF
TYPOGRAPHIC MAN 206 (1962, U.S. prtg. 1964).
243. See Calvin Massey, Civic Discourse Amid Cultural Transformation, 12 CARDOZO
STUD. L. & LITERATURE 193, 194-98 (2000).
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soon understood that the text alone possessed authority2"-Sola
scriptura ("by scripture alone").245 The printing press took from
Rome and Westminster something a millennium of warfare never
had.2" The ideas of individual man, for perhaps the first time,
mattered more than any official orthodoxy.
How dangerous this was. Yet, as the forces of the Church and
the state struck back, its adherents grew only more tenacious.247 Laws
248
against sedition became more invasive and more permeating.
Searches were conducted under general warrants to wipe out
dissidents and radicals.2 49  New laws were enacted, punishments
escalated, licensing laws decreed, and old laws distorted to encompass
the speech of the radicals50 These changes were not marks of a
strong state, but emblems of a weakness.25' And they circled in on
themselves. As the state sought to suppress ever more, citizens
became more distrustful, more concerned with individual rights, and
more certain that individual liberty and dignity should be Western
culture's most fundamental commitments.252
244. See Westminster Confession of Faith 1.9 (1647), reprinted in UNITED
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BOOK OF CONFESSIONS
6.0009 (2d ed. 1970); J. SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN
SELDEN ESQ. 25-26 (London 1699).
245. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution As Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984)
("the bible was its own interpreter").
246. ELIZABETH L. EISENSTEIN, THE PRINTING REVOLUTION IN EARLY MODERN
EUROPE 165-68 (2005).
247. See LEONA ROSTENBERG, THE MINORITY PRESS & THE ENGLISH CROWN 4
(1971) ("[T]he official attempt to stifle the minorities in England failed. Long after the
defeat of the Armada the orthodox movement persisted in England. The 'Puritannicall
spirits' so abhorred by James I triumphed completely and mastered the realm bequeathed
by him to his son."); FREDERICK SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-
1776 141, 179 (1965).
248. See Richard J. Ross, The Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance
Debate over Printing English Law, 1520-1640, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 323, 417-32 (1998).
249. See Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the
Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 717-22 (1985).
250. Lawrence S. Zacharias, The Narrative Impulse in Judicial Opinions, 23 LAW &
LITERATURE 80, 90-93 (2011).
251. See HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 92-93 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1968) ("[S]ince authority always
demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet
authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority
itself has failed.").
252. See Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42 GA. L. REV. 309, 323-25 (2008);
Zacharias, supra note 250, at 92 ("[Tlhis was a new reality that Englishmen were
experiencing for the first time after 1580. In this context, 'Elizabethan Englishmen began
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From these beginnings there is etched somewhere deep in our
social consciousness-passed down in a father's glance, a mother's
stare-an ineradicable image from the 1580s. 253 An image of rebel
Puritans working desperately through the night, hands shaking,
etching ungrammatical words on cheap paper, moving the presses to
escape capture 25 4 as English censors roam the streets."' These Puritan
publishers, outlaws in an authoritarian state, would be tortured and
imprisoned if they were captured. Yet they published because they
believed so strongly in the message they had to share.27
This image flickers forward through the centuries. It is our vision
of expression. It is the man before the tank, Solzhenitsyn in the
Gulag, the Twitter revolutionary. 258  These images-all from
authoritarian regimes-are what we point to because they embody
our notion of why we protect expressive freedom. Those radical
Puritans working furiously through the night are who we are trying to
shield with this First Amendment of ours.
The roots of the First Amendment, thus, run deep. So deep we
scarcely see them. The First Amendment acknowledges a pre-
political commitment at our society's heart. It is a right to decide for
ourselves the merits and demerits of a claim. It has never been about
building a wall-senseless and unfeeling-that bars the state from all
to insist that their houses were castles for the paradoxical reason that the castle-like
security that those houses had afforded from intrusion was vanishing."').
253. See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA 7 (Jamie Kalven Jr. ed., 1988) ("First and most important, the freedom of
speech clause of the First Amendment has been the beneficiary of the religion clauses.").
254. See Janet Halley, Of Time and the Pedagogy of Critical Legal Studies,
Commentary to DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF
HIERARCHIES: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM 189-90 (2004).
255. See Zacharias, supra note 250, at 92.
256. Some of these Puritan publishers were, in fact, captured and tortured. See
Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege Against
Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part 1), 53 OHIO ST.
L.J. 101, 120-22 (1992); Meyerson, supra note 235, at 301-02.
257. See WILLIAM PIERCE, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE MARPRELATE
TRACTS: A CHAPTER IN THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGIOUS AND CIVIL LIBERTY IN
ENGLAND 219-40 (1908). For an account of at least some of the ways this radicalism
echoed and influenced English thinking in the decades that followed, see CHRISTOPHER
HILL, MILTON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 93-116 (1977).
258. See, e.g., MOROZOV, supra note 39, at 1-5; ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, THE
GULAG ARCHIPELAGO (1st ed. 1973); James Barron, Crackdown in Beijing; One Man




participation in the sphere of speech.259 Rather, the institution of
speech was meant to draw a circle around individual man, a circle
within which he possesses the liberty to choose what he will believe,
and find others he might convince to do the same.
B. Speech as a Means and Not an End
This vision of the history and potential future of speech is one of
a robust and still deeply libertarian institution. It is a vision of speech
as performing the function of maintaining individuality, tolerance and
multiplicity in society by creating a sphere beyond coercive reach.
But it understands that speech is a means, and not an end. That
speech serves some purpose in society.260 Until relatively recently,
this was how the judiciary understood it as well.261
Neither Justice Holmes nor Justice Brandeis ever thought
speech, as speech, was an end unto itself.2 62 For each, the point and
purpose of speech was to carve a space in our political discourse in
which it could persuade on the merits of its arguments. In Abrams,
Gitlow, and Whitney, these Justices-who laid the foundation for so
many of the cases that came after-relied on the notion that the First
Amendment protects speech so as to protect an individual's
opportunity to persuade and be persuaded.2 63 This is an aim
motivated by a profound respect for both individual autonomy and
the power of speech to legitimize the exercise of authority. This is
entwined in Brandeis' famous lines: "If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence." 264 "Such must be the rule if authority is to be
reconciled with freedom."265
259. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 785-87 (1987).
260. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 140, at 20.
261. See KALVEN, supra note 253; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641
(1994) ("At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration,
and adherence. Our political system and cultural life rest upon this ideal.").
262. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(articulating that the purpose of First Amendment protection is to preserve a sphere in
which speech is given the opportunity to persuade on its merits); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.").
263. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 337-38 (1991).
264. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
265. Id.
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Even Justice Hugo Black-for whom "no law" meant "no
law" 2"-believed that the state had some role to play where it could
enhance, rather than diminish, those aims. In Associated Press v.
United States, Justice Black wrote on behalf of the Court that it
"degrade[s]" the First Amendment to use it as a shield for business
practices that restrict the "dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources."267 In Marsh v. Alabama, he wrote that
where private actors occupy positions akin to public ones, they
possess "an identical interest in the functioning of the community in
such manner that the channels of communication remain free.",2  As
late as 1980, this principle-that the government could enact speech-
enhancing legislation-was solid First Amendment doctrine.269
Now, it wobbles. In the thirty years since PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, the notion of speech as a means to an end has
somehow collapsed into an end itself. In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,
the Supreme Court declared its new understanding of the First
Amendment: that, heretofore, it would operate as the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty of contract once did. 270 The Court would apply
strict scrutiny to everything that touched upon speech, not just
regulations that endangered important speech interests.271 If not for
the dangers this doctrine now poses to the very interests it seeks to
protect, this understanding might have been a great victory. Today,
266. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring).
267. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7, 20 (1945); see also Times-
Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 602-03 (1953) ("The press ... serves
one of the most vital of all general interests: the dissemination of news from as many
different sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is possible. That interest
is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First
Amendment; it presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is,
and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."); Kan. City Star Co. v.
United States, 240 F.2d 643, 666 (8th Cir. 1957) ("Freedom to print does not mean
freedom to destroy. To use the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment
to destroy competition would defeat its own ends . . .
268. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946).
269. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1980); FCC v. Nat'l
Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 801 n.18 (1978) ("This court has held that
application of the antitrust laws to newspapers is not only consistent with, but is actually
supportive of the values underlying, the First Amendment.").
270. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992).
271. Id. at 384-86; see also Kagan, supra note 15, at 416-23 (explaining the puzzle of
R.A. V. and attempting to proffer a justification for the Court's holding-ultimately finding
one in deep suspicion of government motives whenever the government intervenes in a
content-discriminatory manner).
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however, it threatens to undermine the very interests in liberty and
autonomy at the core of the First Amendment precisely because
those interests stand to be increasingly conscripted and controlled by
powerful private entities.
It is not that the Court has distorted First Amendment doctrine
in moving toward the paradigm it has. Rather, we are experiencing a
change in underlying facts about the world that will force a radical
reimagining of how the values in the First Amendment are to
operate.272 The philosophy of R.A. V. and its progeny no longer
protects the interests it was meant to. The preservation of First
Amendment liberty in the new information society demands
government empowerment to preserve the interests at the First
Amendment's heart.
V. Toward a New Conception of Expressive Freedom
The changes wrought by the concentration of algorithmic power
in the hands of a few platforms on our common discourse will require
that the Court brush off some old First Amendment doctrines and
fashion some new ones.
It is worth emphasizing that much of modern First Amendment
doctrine need not change, even in the Internet's new speech context.
As the preceding section showed, the principle guiding First
Amendment doctrine has long been, and should be, individual
liberty-concern with whether a government intervention enhances
individual autonomy and promotes important political and cultural
deliberation. Because government regulations that single out
speakers and speech for their views and opinions are anathema to this
purpose, courts should remain vigilant where the First Amendment's
core concerns with content and viewpoint discrimination are plainly
implicated. The overriding importance of applying strict scrutiny to
legislation that targets speech on the basis of its content or viewpoint
is unaffected by the technological power of Internet platforms.
But, on platforms that possess the kind of power Facebook and
Google wield, at least five kinds of content-based government
interventions should not be subjected to traditional heightened
272. Scholars have begun to grapple with this issue. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 18, at
318-19; Marvin Ammori, First Amendment Architecture, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (2012);
Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating: Determining What
"The Freedom of Speech" Encompasses, 60 DuKE L.J. 1673, 1674-76 (2011); Christopher
Witteman, Information Freedom, A Constitutional Value for the 21st Century, 36
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 146-47 (2013); Yoo, supra note 4.
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scrutiny. First are those that seek to vindicate procedural justice
values by, for instance, requiring that a platform provide some
specified amount of process before terminating user accounts or
censoring user speech. Second are those that require viewpoint
neutrality or content-tolerance; for example, those requiring a social
network or search engine to not discriminate against speech on the
basis of its political viewpoint. Third are those that require
transparency and disclosure; for example, those requiring that speech
platforms explain openly how their ranking algorithms work. Fourth
are those that limit the ability of these platforms to gather, transfer,
and sell personal user data. Fifth are those that limit the ability of
platforms to write contracts requiring users to alienate aspects of their
identity or intellectual property.
These are all likely to be called content-based restrictions on
platform "speech" under the rule the Supreme Court announced in
Sorrell, and under modern First Amendment doctrine will be
subjected to heightened (probably strict) scrutiny. There are some
caveats to this rule, tucked away in the recesses of the First
Amendment. Older First Amendment doctrine, such as that
promulgated in Associated Press v. United States and Marsh v.
Alabama, would have no trouble, for instance, upholding such
regulations.2" Even modern First Amendment doctrine retains some
space for such regulation, established in cases like Turner
Broadcasting v. FCC.2 74 But the exceptions they carve are exceedingly
narrow. For the most part, modern First Amendment law makes it
extremely unlikely that most statutes drafted with these purposes will
receive anything less than strict scrutiny.7
273. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81 (1980); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7, 20 (1945).
274. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 654-57 (1994) (explaining that
any regulation limiting the editorial discretion of cable companies must be content-
neutral, serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open alternative channels of
communication).
275. In particular a case called Tornillo and another called Pacific Gas, coupled with
R.A. V. and Sorrell mean that any content-based imposition on the editorial discretion of
powerful speech platforms will nonetheless be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis. See
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn.,
505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992) ("[T]he First Amendment imposes ... a 'content discrimination'
limitation upon a State's prohibition of [even concededly] proscribable speech."); Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) (responding to a
requirement that public utilities include a third-party newsletter in their billing envelopes
the Court responded by noting that "forced associations that burden protected speech are
impermissible. The Commission's order is inconsistent with these principles. The order
does not simply award access to the public at large; rather, it discriminates on the basis of
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But, they should not be subjected to such heightened scrutiny
requirements. The exceptionally complex interaction between
individuals and digital speech platforms mediated by computer
algorithms will require speech-regarding legislation of unprecedented
depth and detail. Such complex statutory schemes, moreover, can be
easily stymied where one element of the scheme is singled out and
then struck down, even though it does not pose a threat to critical
constitutional interests in the context of the statute as a whole. This is
one of the most important principles underlying across-the-board
deference to economic legislation. Even where no individual element
of the statute is perfectly consistent with every constitutional value we
might regard as prized, in the context of necessarily complex
legislation meant to advance important constitutional values, the
perfect is the enemy of the good.
Most important of all, not all content-based and viewpoint-based
legislation is the same. There is a fundamental distinction-a
distinction that R.A.V and Lochner both ignored-between
legislation that promotes individual liberty and legislation that
restricts individual liberty. Laws that single out individuals or groups
on the basis of their ideas are not the same as laws that seek to
restrict the power of private actors to restrain the speech of others.
Each of the five categories of interests that should be subject to
reduced scrutiny seek to free individual speakers from the restraints
that might be imposed upon them by others. By enhancing process,
tolerance, access to information, and privacy, legislation designed to
effectuate such aims differs markedly from archetypical content-
based legislation. It does so precisely because it is directed at
eliminating restraints that would otherwise be imposed by powerful
institutions. Where legislation seeks to prevent platforms from
restraining the speech of individuals by filtering it, distorting it,
chilling it, or censoring it, that legislation should not be subjected to
strict scrutiny.
the viewpoints of the selected speakers."); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 256 (1974) (striking down a statute that required that Florida newspapers print replies
from political candidates to editorials attacking their personal character, the Court wrote
that "[ciompelling editors or publishers to publish that which 'reason' tells them should
not be published" is what is at issue in this case. The Florida statute operates as a
command in the same sense as a statue or regulation forbidding appellant to publish
specified matter. Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or
traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers.
The Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper.").
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A similar principle already quietly resides in the interstices of
First Amendment doctrine, at least to some degree. In the 2001 case
Bartnicki v. Vopper, for example, the Court confronted circumstances
that placed two of the First Amendment's most compelling interests
directly into conflict-"on the one hand, the interest in the full and
free dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on
the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more
specifically, in fostering private speech."2 16 Perhaps the Court only
balanced these concerns in Bartnicki because it felt the conflict
unavoidable, but the speech interests in cases like Young present no
less compelling conflicts. Just as the Court was ultimately forced to
assess the important speech interests on both sides in Bartnicki, so too
should the courts grapple with the important speech interests that are
at stake when Facebook censors art, political speech, news, and
family photos. It is no argument to say that Facebook is a free service
and that participation is a privilege. Not on a platform home to 1.1
billion active users across the globe that has become perhaps our
society's most important center for political and civic life.277
Conclusion
The information age is a new paradigm, and new paradigms
mean more than casting old ideas in new frames. New paradigms
mean dislocation and division. New paradigms require an acceptance
that when fact and principle diverge it is the facts, ultimately, that
matter.278 We need a First Amendment that operates functionally, not
formally-an Amendment that preserves, foremost, the rights of
individuals to engage, participate, speak, persuade, and be persuaded
on the merits. We need a new First Amendment if we are to navigate
between the promise and perils of the New Speech.
Even in the current legal landscape where the First Amendment
is hardly ever in issue because terms of service contracts and federal
law align against the vindication of speech claims by individuals,
courts would better serve First Amendment values if they articulated
276. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001).
277. See David Lat, Facebook Banned Me! Worst. Week. Ever., N.Y. OBSERVER (Mar.
4, 2008), http://observer.com/2008/03/facebook-banned-me-worst-week-ever/?show=all
("[Aifter enduring the hell of five days without Facebook, I will not stray again. The
sanction has served its purpose.").
278. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-95 (1954); see also Charles L. Black, Jr.,
The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 421-22 (1960); see also
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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the speech consequences of their decisions. 279 By doing so, courts can
help show the ways in which the First Amendment is disserved by the
current legal regime which prevents all government interference with
the censorship of private platforms&0  But, this will require
recognition by the judiciary, and by society more broadly, of the ways
in which the New Speech differs from the old. Until that recognition
comes, we wait. And in the law's deep glens, in the streams and the
starscapes crossed with vermiculate patterns, far off in the distance,
"reawakens Lochner."a1
279. See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government
in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 359-67 (2011) (describing the important
role of Courts in articulating social and political values even where they are not
institutionally suited to address the problem in a satisfactory way).
280. Courts should also try to deter attempts to evade the First Amendment by
government and private actors who will endeavor to hiding important decisions about
speech in Code they write and the consumer protection and competition policies they
enforce. This may be an impossible goal to vindicate in the judiciary, but courts might
nonetheless try.
281. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2685 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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